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Abstract
The doctoral dissertation of Laura Gianfagna, Ph.D. Candi-
date in Economics at IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca,
is submitted at IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca. The
original research thesis studies unsolicited weak points of the
current Global Financial Architecture and unknown sources
of financial contagion. The dissertation provides policy ad-
vice and innovative methodologies to improve the current
financial supervisory monitoring.
The main topics covered are credit risk and financial risk.
On the credit risk side, the author addresses two issues: a
lack of regulatory supervision for Multilateral Development
Banks and a model risk that the economic capital calculation
for portfolio credit risk and the regulatory capital calculation
for counterparty credit risk have in common. On the financial
risk side, the thesis estimates a significant impact of corporate
control on stock market volatility. The empirical investiga-
tion confers the right to exist to an entity acting on financial
market prices through the property channel, in parallel to
business groups. An innovative methodology is then applied
to the Interest Rate Swap market to detect correlation and
co–movements among its subclasses aggregated by contrac-
tual characteristics. All the results contribute to the research
literature on early warning triggers for systemic risk.
xiii
Executive summary
The Global Financial Architecture is an agreed set of rules on the capital
markets among the financial institutions that govern the vast majority
of the World Gross Domestic Product. The adjective global refers to the
global prosperity and stability purpose that accompanied the historical
process of creation of a unified and transparent regulatory environment
for financial markets, as well as the policy responsibilities over the oc-
currence of the economic globalization. The role of the Economists is
precisely providing policy advice stemming from exact research inve-
stigation: Economists propose theories and models to capture general
equilibrium1 as well as market frictions and asymmetries and financial
markets imperfections2. Financial Economists acknowledge the difficul-
ties of keeping financial markets stable from volatility and the persisting
effects of financial crises on the economy. Financial stability has become
a major concern to policymakers as a precondition to a sustainable eco-
nomic growth since the distinction between business and financial cycles
that run in parallel at different frequency3. Macroprudential regulation
brought the international attention on the Global Financial Architecture
after detecting systemic risk as the fertile ground for the propagation of
1See e.g. Walras (2013), Smith (1976), Keynes (2016), Nash (1950), Arrow and Debreu
(1954), Modigliani and Miller (1958), Sharpe (1964), Tobin (1969), Arrow (1971), Cox et al.
(1985), Merton (1987), Longstaff and Schwartz (1992), Debreu (1996).
2See e.g. Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990), Minsky (1977), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), Stiglitz
(1999), Bernanke et al. (1999), Almeida et al. (2004), Krugman (2009).
3See e.g. Borio and Lowe (2002), Borio (2014).
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financial and economic shocks4. Nevertheless, recent regulatory deve-
lopments for financial intermediaries issued by international supervision
bodies highlight the necessity of further research, explanations, and po-
licy advice from the Academic sector.
The dissertation contributes to this goal by assessing four hidden risks
into the Global Financial Architecture. The research thesis encompasses
four essays, equally divided into theoretical and practical investigations.
The first and the last essays of the dissertation compare the models used
in banking practice and financial regulation and the scope of the finan-
cial regulation, respectively. Two intermediate essays quantify a source
of corporate financial contagion and a distress measure for derivative
markets, respectively. More precisely, chapters 1 and 4 address the in-
ternational regulation for financial institutions and point out two severe
shortages for the assessment of credit risk: lack of an independent mo-
del testing for financial institutions and high reliance on Credit Rating
Agencies for regulatory requirements the first, and lack of a unified in-
ternational regulatory supervision for Multilateral Lending Institutions
the second. Chapter 2 and chapter 3 address the financial instability by
discovering a channel for the propagation of volatility across financial
markets and a methodology to order co–movements among submarkets
according to their riskiness. A closer focus on each chapter is now de-
tailed.
Chapter 1 proceeds to address the usage of Merton’s model and e-
xamining the role of information into financial default models. One
question is how information is transposed into the models used for as-
sessing credit risk. The exercise answers that structural–form models are
the most employed into the current banking practice. This kind of model
assumes that both the market and the corporate have real–time access
to the most available information and it reflects the complete informa-
4See e.g. on Global Financial Architecture Levine (1997), Daniel (2017), Hofmann et al.
(2017), UNCTAD (2015), and on systemic risk Tarashev et al. (2009), Caruana (2010), Acharya
et al. (2017). An interesting commentary is provided by https://piie.com/commentary/
speeches-papers/reshaping-global-financial-architecture.
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tion in the calculation performed for the credit risk assessment. In this
framework, every external shock is exogenous to the model, that must
re–adapt its parameters to encompass the new condition. Furthermore,
these models focus on hypotheses, such as the normality assumption on
the distribution of losses or the reliance on external credit ratings, that
result too poorly conservative for risk management purposes. Another
question is the scope of application of the same model to different risk
assessments. If several risk metrics rely on the same methodology, this
could raise an issue on the correct risk assessment. The thesis assesses
such an issue between regulation and banking practice.
Another regulatory shortcoming is posed by chapter 4, that addresses
the lack of a unified supervision for Multilateral Development Banks.
Because of the lack of financial regulatory regime their current operating
framework is not comparable to the regulated banking sector. It also en-
tails credit risk since standardized credit risk assessment is a precondition
for a smooth lending environment in which banks have not to do credit
rationing or shrink their assets to save capital, especially in low–capital
markets environment where the traditional banking lending still prevails.
After the financial crisis of 2007–2008 this was instead the case for ad-
vanced economies, especially the Euro area, frightened by an enormous
amount of non–performing loans and small margins. A consequence
has been the increasing recourse to extraordinary funding provided by
Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). Given the massive movement
of money across worldwide borrowers, should MDBs be internationally
regulated?
Chapter 2 identifies the corporate ownership relationship with a well–
defined entity acting on listed markets as a channel for the propagation
of the financial volatility of stock market prices. The unique worldwide
dataset and the research methodology allow for an accurate identifica-
tion of correlations within a parent company and its affiliates over time
and across countries for both domestic and MultiNational Enterprises
(MNEs). The methodology is tested against different volatility metrics
xvi
and can be readily generalized to multi–layered business groups. The
results show less variance at a group level than across firms and time,
and price activities show a narrower range of volatility when a hierarchy
of companies is established. This is likely due to information on the com-
mon fundamentals that is passed to investors when the latter consider all
the companies as a unique entity. A consequence is that a shock occurring
in one affiliate can move faster to its co–affiliates, within one country in
case of a domestic group, and across countries, in the case of MNEs.
Chapter 3 is the first empirical research on systemic risk assessment
based on micro-founded Interest Rate Swaps (IRS) data from a trade
repository. It studies the relationship among subsegments of a finan-
cial market as a way to identify potential financial distress through in-
creased co–movements among them. The combination of granular data
on Over-The-Counter (OTC) derivatives and a Joint Probability of Dis-
tress (JPoD) methodology let define a distress indicator that combines
several distress drivers. The results put similarities between financial
and contractual terms as responsible for stronger co–movements among
submarkets. However, high values for JPoD even in correspondence of
dissimilar sub-markets suggest the presence of other drivers that should
be investigated in future research.
Tackling hidden risks into the Global Financial Architecture is a com-
plex challenge that requires both micro and macro approaches. The
matter and its scope range from corporate finance to financial markets
and from a single market to international Economics respectively. The
instances covered by the doctoral thesis reflect this broad spectrum of to-
pics, and they expand into four essays regarding credit risk and financial
risk. The rationale linking the four of them is the awareness that a proper
risk assessment is at the baseline of discovering sources of systemic risk
or early warning triggers for the Global Financial Architecture.
Since systemic risk is a relatively new field of research, in the future
more effort could go into comparing the estimators for systemic risk
xvii
and other types of risk and estimating the impacts in figures that each
source of concern delivers, so to quantitatively assess the proportion of
systemic risk due to other risks. Such an estimation would be beneficial
to systemic risk that is by its nature tightly related to the sources of other
hazards. However, definition and measurement of systemic risk have
still to proceed on their own in the research literature. Therefore it is not
wasted a preliminary focus on the background matters, foreseeing their
future application and a vast work left to future studies.
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Chapter 1
Rating and pricing: state of
the art for the proposal of
new methodologies
1.1 Introduction
The first essay of the dissertation will guide the reader through the con-
cept of financial risk by pointing out an evident - yet undiscovered - re-
lationship among the main model on which important pricing dynamics
are based. What is a financial risk, which branches of risk management it
involves, why it can stem from credit risk will be explained. The novelty
of the research is discovering the dynamics through which credit risk
may generate a financial risk by affecting the pricing methodologies of
financial contracts. Such a dynamics has a common and evident denomi-
nator, namely the mathematical models based on normality assumptions.
To introduce this dynamics, firstly the definitions of financial and credit
risks will be clarified; secondly, the process through which the two risks
are related will be described. The thesis is that this relationship con-
stitutes a financial risk itself because of self-referentiality of the models.
Self-referentiality of the models entails two channels: Merton’s models
that assume a conditional normal distribution of losses and credit ratings.
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While credit ratings have been proved as a not sufficient methodology for
credit risk purposes because of being static1, the former issue has never
been made clear enough to the best of authors’ knowledge. The hypothe-
sis of normality is quite common, but it excludes the case of fat tails of the
loss distribution that can generate damage to the economy more severe
than expected. Although there is evidence that the normality assumption
is unrealistic in some cases2, the vast majority of financial models, espe-
cially the regulatory ones, rely on it. Models based on world-normality
assumption range from credit risk and counterparty credit risk models
to interest rate risk models, GARCH time series, Bayesian inference, Dy-
namic Stochastic General Equilibrium models. This chapter will cover
some of them, leaving a major revision of all the models based on nor-
mality assumptions to future work.
This chapter will focus on the systematic self-referentiality of the credit
risk management framework by explaining the credit rating issue and by
focusing on Merton’s historical passage that ties credit risk to counter-
party credit risk. Merton’s model is a revolutionarily brilliant discovery;
nonetheless, the nexus detectable through several practices can raise a
major consequence on financial and credit markets because of its ex-
tensive application producing arbitrages and because of no test against
different underlying models. The situation is exacerbated by the current
regulatory regime regarding counterparty credit risk, requiring banks to
compute regulatory capital with the same methodology used for credit
portfolio models and pricing. In the current setting, banks’ stress testing
becomes an active measure for model calibration and the only source of
backtesting. Instead, going to the roots of the models, many possibilities
are envisaged to provide an alternative route of mathematical modeling.
This will be given at the end of the chapter in section 1.6. Section 1.2 poses
1See e.g. the assessment of Hilscher and Wilson (2016).
2The normality assumption has been proved to be misleading for risk management. E.g.,
Danielsson and de Vries (1997) show that models based on conditional normality are not
well suited to estimating large quantiles of the profit and loss distribution. McNeil and Frey
(2000) confirm that an assumption of conditional normality of residuals is unrealistic for
the strictly stationary time series representing daily observations of the negative log return
on a financial asset price.
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the research question by clarifying the main terminology and explaining
the key passage that binds counterparty credit risk and a financial sys-
temic risk through the pricing la Merton. Merton’s framework will be
analysed in section 1.4 after an overview in section 1.3 of main credit
portfolio models that heavily rely on it Merton’s model. Then the regu-
latory perspective on counterparty credit risk methodology of section 1.5
will provide an example of pricing and rating issues. For a better under-
standing of how the issues are linked a conceptual map of the chapter is
presented in figure 1.
1.2 Research question and related literature
The research question can be summarized as the theoretical investigation
of a self-referentiality of models assessing different kinds of risk. To in-
troduce this self-referentiality we explore the nexus between credit and
financial risks. A financial risk expresses the investor’s uncertainty of
collecting returns and the possibility of monetary loss. On a vast scale,
monetary losses may affect the real economy; by contrast, not necessarily
a financial risk stems from economic conditions or dynamics. Often a
financial risk is triggered either by the incorrect evaluation of investment
solutions or by unpredictable accidents not related to the financial sec-
tor. To Nobel Prize Sir Robert Merton, Economics would be sufficient to
describe and manage financial transactions across agents and Countries
if no risks were existing. Financial risk cannot be deleted but it has to be
transferred: this is the main objective of Finance. The financial risk related
to a creditor’s solvency or a portfolio worthiness is addressed by Credit
risk. The document Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2000)
sets the aim of credit risk for banks: maximise the risk-adjusted rate of
return by maintaining the credit risk exposure within acceptable param-
eters. Maintaining the credit risk exposure within acceptable parameters
requires a risk assessment of the portfolio and of single counterparts.
When counterparts are subject to rating assessment by the Credit Rating
Agencies (CRAs) then the evaluation of a creditor’s worthiness may be
based upon those external rating already assigned to creditors. The out-
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put process of a creditor evaluation serves as a basis for the pricing of
unexpected losses or derivative contracts. Derivatives (such as futures,
forwards, swaps, options, credit derivatives, mortgage-backed security)
are made between two financial parties for many purposes. Derivatives
are used for hedging (e.g., insuring against risk on an asset or circum-
venting exchange rate issues) or for speculation in betting the future
price of the underlying asset. The value of these securities depends on
one or more underlying assets such as stocks, bonds, commodities, cur-
rencies, interest rates and market indexes; that is why most derivatives
are traded Over-The-Counter (OTC) rather than on a regulated exchange.
Such contracts are created to transfer the risk, inasmuch they reduce the
risk related to changes in the value of the underlying asset. Investors
buy derivative contracts to protect against the possibility of a monetary
loss. The attribution of a correct price to such notes is therefore extremely
important: it is meant to reflect a proper risk assessment, and it can be
derived from the price of the underlying.
The process of the attribution of an unbiased price is called pric-
ing. Modern pricing theory reveals that a correct pricing is equal to the
discounted expected value of the future payoff of the derivative; the ex-
pectation is computed not under the physical probability of future events,
but under a new risk-neutral measure that turns the stochastic process of
price of the underlying into a martingale3 (Karlsen (2010), Hull (2006)).
A proper pricing should not give room to endogenously created market
arbitrage. Following the definition of Björk (2009), a market arbitrage
happens when it is possible to purchase and sell the same security at the
same time in different markets to take advantage of a price difference
between the two separate markets. This is equivalent to the possibility of
making a positive amount of money out of nothing without taking any
risk: a free lunch on the financial market. Arbitrage possibilities represent
a case of mispricing in the market. Efficient markets show no arbitrages:
3A martingale process realizes, at discrete-time, when the conditional expected value of
the next observation, given the past observations, is equal to the most recent past observa-
tion.
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if any, they would (or tend to) clear reciprocally4. Market arbitrages can
be positive, neutral or dangerous. Literature has found that sometimes
temporary arbitrages are useful to bypass market anomalies, such as when
they favour the offsetting of excess or deficiency falls of equity returns into
the liquidity market5. Nevertheless, arbitrage is found to become ineffec-
tive in extreme circumstances when prices diverge far from fundamental
values (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). Furthermore, higher degrees of arbi-
trage risk is correlated to anomalies persistent over an extended period of
time6. Therefore, through arbitrages, severe or repeated mispricing can
lead to market imbalances. The cumulative process of deviations of key
variables from trends contribute to the build-up of vulnerabilities, alter
the financial cycle and may harm the equilibrium of the global financial
architecture7.
This chapter will study the nexus between credit risk and the financial
risk given by a possibility of derivatives (mis)pricing due to model risk.
In this case, model risk is not the risk that the model is wrong per se, but
market arbitrages due to the same model applied to estimate credit risk.
Regulatory prescriptions focusing once more on the same underlying mo-
del create a nexus between credit risk and counterparty credit risk; some
recurrent aspects among the methodologies are highlighted as a possible
source of market biases because of models’ systemic self-referentiality.
Merton’s model is the most used for credit portfolio risk. Since more
than thirty years, the Black-Scholes-Merton models are also part of the
best banking practice of every financial institution. Banking regulation is
heavily relying on them. Although this evidence is there for all to see, to
the best of authors’ knowledge this is the first time that a model issue is
pointed out with both regulatory and mathematical details. The author
emphasizes a positive correlation between credit risk, that is the possi-
4The fundamental theorem of asset pricing is assumed. According to it, a market is
efficient if no arbitrage is possible. See more e.g. in Dybvig and Ross (2003).
5See Chordia et al. (2014).
6See in Chou et al. (2013) the case of trading volume.
7Suggested literature about market vulnerabilities leading to bouts of financial instability
includes Arnold et al. (2012), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009), Acharya et al. (2017), Caballero
and Krishnamurthy (2009).
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bility of transfer of an agent’s economic distress via a financial asset, and
systemic risk, defined á la Rochet and Tirole (1996) as the propagation of
an agent’s economic distress to other agents linked to that agent through
financial transactions8.
Previous literature expressed a sort of complementarity between the
two of them, posing, however, a challenge to financial regulation. This is
e.g. the finding of Nijskens and Wagner (2011). Back to the cause of the
crisis of 2007-2009, they analyse various ways through which banks have
transferred credit risk into the financial system: while banks may have
shed their individual credit risk, they actually posed a greater systemic
risk. Therefore, this systemic factor should represent a challenge for fi-
nancial regulation, since regulation has typically focused on individual
institutions. Analogous conclusion that Basel capital requirements are
designed to limit each institution’s risk seen in isolation, and they are
not sufficiently focused on systemic risk is drawn by the recent paper
Acharya et al. (2017). The systemic-risk component of their model is
precisely correlated to a bank’s expected losses during a crisis and to a
financial firm’s marginal expected shortfall, i.e., its losses in the tail of the
aggregate sector’s loss distribution, other than to its leverage. This re-
sult confirms the hypothesis of bias coming from the underlying models,
which turns into a systematic effect. Although the systemic effects of
financial dynamics are the object of much research, such as Freixas et al.
(2000), Kreis and Leisen (2017), Aldasoro et al. (2017), mainly devoted to
study the credit lines into interbank market as a propagator of system in-
stability, so far no dynamics has been linked to what can be the source of
this systemic instability, namely the financial risk generated by the com-
mon denominator of risk models. To test this hypothesis, we have first to
proving that such possibility is concrete. The aim of this research chapter
is precisely to analyse models correlation from a theoretical perspective,
giving some mathematical hints to overcome superseded models. Future
research could be devoted to prove this correlation in figures. We will
see that a key point of financial models is how information is reflected in
8See e.g. Bonollo et al. (2014a) for a comprehensive overview on systemic risk.
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the model; this includes the information that we know from the past, like
credit ratings. Recent papers such as Ahnert and Georg (2017) and Alda-
soro et al. (2017) link bank networks contagion and information; Hilscher
and Wilson (2016) links credit risk and rating. Although this research
addresses different facets of the same issue, none is able to relate all the
features from a unique perspective. A recent banking directive on coun-
terparty credit risk will allow linking together all the pieces of the puzzle
that can connect credit risk to systemic risk, hopefully contributing to
the enhancement of the underlying financial modelling. The following
sessions will deal with topics apparently uncorrelated; actually, they all
use the same structural form model for different kinds of risk assessment.
A conceptual map is provided by figure 1.
7
Figure 1: Conceptual map of the chapter
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1.3 Models for assessing Economic Capital
Financial institutions need to have in place internal models for the assess-
ment of the level of the overall capital buffer which is deemed sufficient to
cover the risk of their business activities. Economic Capital is computed
as follows: firstly a distribution of losses is inferred from the distribution
of the portfolio. Decided a quantile, the average loss beyond the quantile
or Expected Shortfall (ES) is computed, determining by difference the
economic capital requirement9.
Figure 2: Probability density function of credit losses as a percentage of total
assets
Merton’s methodology is vastly employed by the most common credit
portfolio models for assessing economic capital requirements. Figure 3
shows a comparison of credit portfolio models for assessing economic ca-
pital. Among the four models, the most used are CreditMetrics and KMV
PortfolioManager; both are based on Merton’s formula. An underlying
mathematical equivalence among these models has been demonstrated
by Gordy (2000). From this substantial equivalence, we can infer that the
9On the contrary, Regulatory Capital is computed through the Value at Risk (VaR), that
is the loss corresponding to a determined quantile. More precisely, the credit VaR at a
confidence level q is the q-quantile of the loss distribution minus the Expected Loss (EL).
The ES at confidence level q is the expected portfolio loss conditional on losses exceeding
the q-quantile, minus the EL. See Ribarits et al. (2014).
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vast majority of models that assess portfolio credit risk for economic ca-
pital is amenable to Merton’s modelling. This is not a problem per se, but
together with the fact that the economic capital calculations enter many
usages (such as unexpected losses pricing proposals, setting of capital
requirements, definition of the risk appetite framework of the bank, ca-
pital allocation and stress testing purposes) a model issue is envisaged if
many other risks of a financial institution are assessed through the same
methodology. The fact that Economic Capital should be independently
assessed is not only a common best practice, but it is a Basel require-
ment. The Basel requirements, whose conceptual framework is detailed
in section 1.5, constitute the three pillars that financial institutions have
to ensue. Those pillars are the Regulatory Capital (RGC) and Economic
Capital (EC) requirements, i.e. money to set aside for economic down-
turns, and disclosure requirements for transparency purposes. While
regulatory capital requirements are the same for all banks, regardless of
their size, focus or statute, economic capital requirements should express
the internal view of the bank’s portfolio losses. To this purpose, Eco-
nomic Capital takes into account the bank’s actual portfolio composition
and characteristics in terms of concentration and diversification. While
the regulatory view imposes rules-based calculation given by Basel III
Pillar I standards, economic capital assesses credit risk through Monte–
Carlo simulations. Although the different set up between RGC and EC
let intend the different nature of the calculations and their aim to be in-
dependently assessed, the underlying Merton model is found to appear
also in RGC calculations in section 1.5. To understand better how it is
that possible, a preliminary knowledge of Merton’s model is provided in
section 1.4.
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Figure 3: A comparison of main credit portfolio models
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1.4 Merton’s model
Since Merton’s framework is so common, it is useful to get familiar with
it. Some preliminary definitions are needed to understand the model at
the core of our research chapter. A zero-coupon bond is a debt instru-
ment issued for the purpose of raising capital. Who buys the bond (the
bondholder) is loaning money to the issuer. The bond issuer pays back to
the bondholder no coupon for interest but the entire payment (payoff) at
the expiration date of the contract (maturity). Merton (1974) noted that a
company’s debt is analogous to a zero-coupon bond: if the firm asks for
money to a bank, the bank becomes a bondholder and the payment to the
debtholder at the expiration of the due debt corresponds to the payoff at
maturity to the bondholder. Once liabilities are stochastically modelled,
to make a comparison with the assets value Merton has to render the
market value of the firm as a contingent claim V whose value depends
on a stochastic process W and on time t. Then a firm’s default process is
driven by the evolution of the value of the company’s assets: a default
occurs when, at maturity T, the market value of the firm V is lower than
its liabilities F. The principles of option pricing by Black and Scholes
(1973) can be applied to model the financial evolution of a firm and give a
simple formula for its insolvency risk. If the company were risk–free the
lender would always get back the promised amount F at maturity. So the
lender would be holding a risk free bond D. But companies are not risk
free, there is a chance that they will not be able to repay the full amount
F. If the company value V is less than F at maturity, the company will
default, and the lender will take over the company, that can then be sold
to recover what it was owed partially. So, if at maturity V is greater than F
the lender loses 0 (no default) while if V is smaller than F the lender loses
F − V. In a put option, the bondholder loses nothing if the underlying
S is above the price at which the put option can be exercised (the strike
price) K at maturity and S − K otherwise. Therefore, the payoff to the
debtholder is given by the sum of a safe claim payoff F plus the payoff of
a put option with the value of the firm V as underlying and F the price at
which the put option can be exercised (strike price).
DT = min{F,VT} = F + min{VTF, 0} = F −max{F − VT, 0} (1.1)
Since the evolution of a firm’s asset is driven by the value of the
company’s asset, the risk of a firm’s default is linked to the variability
of the firm’s asset value. For quoted firms, a possibility of structural
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monitoring of the firm’s value is represented by the observable share
prices. From these data it is possible to estimate some useful parameters
such as the assets instantaneous return and the volatility of return of
firms’ assets. It is, therefore, feasible to calibrate the theoretical model of
geometric Brownian motion that has lognormal increments.
dV
V
= µdt + σV(ε
√
dt) (1.2)
Vt is the market value of the firm, dependent on time; µ is a parameter
catching the assets instantaneous return; σV is the volatility measured by
the standard deviation of the assets return.
Figure 4: Possible evolutions of assets value of firm
The credit risk is represented by the possibility that, at maturity T of the debt, the firm’s
asset value VT is lower than the value of the loan repayment. The financial leverage of the
firm is the horizontal line “value of the debt” L = Fe−iT/V.
Since the debtholder’s payoff is the sum of a safe claim payoff and a
short position in a put option written on the firm’s assets, the bond can
be hedged by buying a put option on the value Vt of the firm’s asset,
with maturity equal to the maturity of the loan and strike price equal to
the value of debt reimbursement. In this way, the combination of loan
and purchase of put option gives as a result a guaranteed payoff equal
to the amount of the loan F. The put option represents the loss given
default. The equity holder, assumed to be the residual claimant, receives
vice–versa the payoff of a call option:
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ET = max{VT − F, 0} (1.3)
such that ET + DT = VT.
The risk-free equilibrium is achieved at time t when the synthetic price
of put option and debt is risk–free: Pt + Dt = Fe−i(T−t) with discount factor
i. The debt value is then computed as:
Dt = Fe−i(T−t)N(d2) + VtN(d1) (1.4)








= d2 + σV
√
T − t. (1.5)
Consequently, formulas are derived for the default probability PD =
N(−d2) = 1−N(d2) and the value D0 of the loan, that increases with lower









1.5 Regulatory requirements for counterparty cre-
dit risk
Counterparty credit risk measures the risk associated with derivative
transactions. It differs from the traditional credit risk because of the bi-
lateral risk profile (derivatives can be both asset or liability for different
points in time) and the variation of the exposure depending on market
and counterparty behavior (Usmen (1994) and Sayah (2016)). This section
will study how Counterparty Credit Risk (CCR) is regulated at interna-
tional level by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) is an international financial organization
established in 19630 and owned by 60 member central banks, fostering
discussion and issuing regulatory papers with the aim of promoting fi-
nancial stability. BIS is organized into committees. The one deputed to
banking supervision is the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the
primary global standard setter for the prudential regulation of banks pro-
viding a forum for cooperation on banking supervisory matters. Its man-
date is to strengthen the regulation, supervision, and practices of banks
worldwide with the purpose of enhancing financial stability. Its advice
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is generally accepted and transposed into legal acts or directives by the
recipient countries to implement a unified banking framework. The Stan-
dardised Approach for measuring Counterparty Credit Risk (SA-CCR)
exposures Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014) contains the
methodology proposed by BIS to tackle counterparty credit risk within
the so–called Basel capital framework. The BIS document was issued in
March 2014 and it is into effect since 1 January 2017. It replaces two old
methodologies, namely the Current Exposure Method and the Standard-
ised Method, with the aim of reducing the need for discretion by national
authorities and limiting the use of banks’ internal estimates. Whilst the
aim is defensible in respect of a unified common regulatory system, the
results of this study is that it is actually quite far from being achieved
due to the use of superseded mathematical models, a reliance on CRAs
assessment in some parts of the methodology, and to the implementation
by individual banks within their internal models. Understanding how
the SA-CCR methodology works and the model behind it, other than
being interesting per se, prepares the pave for possible enhancements of
the model behind such an important regulation.
The SA-CCR will apply to over-the-counter derivatives, exchange-
traded derivatives and long settlement transactions. The risky exposure
or Exposure At Default (EAD) is calculated as proportional to the sum of
two components, the amount that an entity would have to pay to replace
an asset at present according to its current worth (Replacement Cost, RC)
and a component that reflects the increases in exposure that could occur
over time (Potential Future Exposure, PFE).
EAD = 1.4 * (RC + PFE) (1.7)
The Replacement Cost (RC) represents a conservative estimate of the
amount the bank would lose if the counterparty were to default immedi-
ately. More precisely, given a financial institution that has a portfolio of
derivative contracts with a counterparty, its exposure to the counterparty
at given future time is provided by the bank’s economic loss in the event
of the counterparty’s default at that time. If the counterparty defaults,
the bank must close out all its positions with the counterparty. To deter-
mine the loss arising from the counterparty’s default, it is convenient to
assume that the bank enters into an equivalent portfolio of trades with
another counterparty in order to maintain its market position. Since the
bank’s market position is unchanged after replacing the trades, the loss
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is determined by the portfolio’s replacement cost at the time of default.
If V denotes the current mark–to–market value V and the counterparty
were to default immediately, the loss for the bank would be equal to the
greater of V and zero. If collateral is held against the derivative portfo-
lio, its market value will determine a haircut whose amount C reflects the
lender’s perceived risk of loss from the asset falling in value or being sold
in a fire sale. The Replacement Cost has then a formula exactly similar to
the call option payoff for equity of Merton’s model:
RC = max{V − C, 0}. (1.8)
Figure 5: Possible evolutions of a derivative value
Contract Mark-to-Market Value and Stand-Alone Contract-Level Counterparty Credit Ex-
posure. Source: Pykhtin et al. (2011).
In the same methodology, supervisory delta adjustments are para-
meters defined at the trade level and applied to the adjusted notional
amounts to reflect the direction of the transaction and its non-linearity.
For call and put options, they exactly recall the parameters d1 and d2 of
the Merton formulas.
Supervisory parameters shown in figure 7 are instead based on sub-
classes of the asset class of the underlying. For the asset class credit, single
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Figure 6: Merton’s formulas applied to counterparty credit risk
Source: Bank for International Settlement (BIS) (2014).
name (corresponding to credit default swaps) the subclasses differentiate
following the rating classes. This classification appears to be innocent.
However, it may contrast the objective of both the Financial Stability
Board in U.S.A. and the European Commission to progressively lower
the reliance on Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) (see Financial Stability
Board (2010) and EC (European Commission) (2014)). Indeed CRAs have
the power to influence the stock markets; it is talked of “dictatorship of
the analysts” since credit ratings enter both the markets by establishing
a risk premium on the company, higher the riskiest the firm, and the
regulatory framework when credit ratings help establishing calibrating
parameters. It represents an externality to the regulatory framework,
and financial institutions could face potential conflicts of interest. This
chapter will skip a solution to the credit rating usage and focus on how
to overcome the model’s problem by proposing alternative ones. This is
the content of section 1.6.
1.6 Reduced-form and partial information mo-
dels
Structural-forms models like Merton’s model rely on the assumption
that every agent in the market can get the same level of disposable in-
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Figure 7: Credit ratings in supervisory parameters for counterparty credit risk
Source: Bank for International Settlement (BIS) (2014).
formation. The mathematical device to represent information is called
“filtration”. More precisely, a filtration F is a family of sets Ft on a prob-
ability space Ω such that each set is contained into the next one. Sets
Ft with 0 ≤ t ≤ T* represent the level of disposable information at each
point in time. The assumption of increasing sets means that agents do
not lose information as time passes by. Sstructural-form models presume
complete knowledge that means the whole filtration (information) un-
derlying. If everything is known or predictable, then there is no room
for chance. However, unpredictable events may still happen within this
framework with serious economic effects. Reduced-form models have
been introduced because, unless modelled through exogeneity simula-
tion, not every default can be predicted. The mathematical framework
beneath those models (intensity based model) is outlined.
On a probability space (Ω,P,P) consider two filtrations: F and G,
defined over the same time interval [0,T*], one contained into the other:
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G = (Gt)[0,T*] ⊆ F = (Ft)[0,T*]. (1.9)
The default arrival is modelled by an aleatory time:
τδ : Ω→ [0,+∞] (1.10)
that indicates a default arrival through a default indicator function
(hazard rate):
H = I{τd≤t}. (1.11)
The hazard rate function is is a (F- G)-adapted stochastic process; this
means that a market participant with access to partial market information
Gt cannot observe whether default has occurred by time t (τd ≤ t) or not
(τd > t). Events in Ft are Gt-observable only when default has not hap-
pened until time t. At time t, the probability of a default before maturity
T is the conditional expected value of the default indicator function at T
given the partial filtration Gt: PD(t) = E[H(T)|Gt].
Even if very versatile, intensity-based models are not convenient to
stakeholders or well-informed private companies that know many things
about a firm. A hybrid model between structural form and intensity mo-
dels is provided by Duffie and Lando (2001). It is based on the assumption
that not everyone has the same information regarding a firm’s asset; the
idea is once again to use different filtrations on the same probability
space. This model allows a possibility of controlling the firm: the asset’s
value is represented by a stochastic process V. The “structural part” of
the model consists of choosing an optimal liquidation policy until the
condition “asset less than liabilities” hold: the choice is made by solv-
ing a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. At the same time, the model
accounts for an unpredictable default arrival, “controlled” by the partial
filtration. The market sees the manager’s information set plus a noise
representing default as a surprise to the market, using filtering theory
to go from the manager’s information to the market’s. An alternative
approach is provided by Cetin et al. (2004). By contrast, in their reduced
form model the market sees a reduction of the manager’s information
set. In both cases, the market’s information set is the same as the man-
ager’s. The difference between the two models is that the perspective
from filtering theory assumes additional noise while the point of view




One should ask why modelling implementations are not often well re-
flected into the regulatory frameworks. In finance, more than in socio-
logy, rules come after the mathematical or economic findings, but more
often rules come after financial practices. This chapter revised two mar-
ket practices that enter the regulatory framework for their easiness to be
applied, although stemming from different assessments: credit ratings,
retrieved from undisclosed algorithms by the Credit Rating Agencies,
and models based on the normality assumption, derived from the lit-
erature on financial research. The importance of credit ratings should
give speed and motivation to private or public Credit Rating Agencies to
improve towards more efficient and accurate models of evaluation. At
the same time, the regulator could continue relying on financial research
and proposing its methodologies for regulatory capital requirements to
financial institutions, but only if models are sufficiently updated to reflect
all research contributions and developments. If, as it seems, the regula-
tor prefers not to explore the latest research frontier but rather use steady
methodologies, at least it should keep a critical eye on the same class of
models driving several risk classes. Otherwise, the same model could
fail in detecting all financial risks in favour of an increase of systemic risk
factors. An immediate consequence is that stress testing is nomore a com-
parative tool to address upward and downward scenarios, but the only
methodology to span the figures result. Future research may include: a
theoretical review of other financial methodologies that are founded on
the same set of assumptions; a quantitative assessment of the impact that
common denominator practices have on risk management; a quantitative
assessment of the impact that common denominator practices have on
arbitrages; the studying of a measure that could be alternative to credit
ratings. This chapter provides an alternative route to the classical mathe-
matical modelling of incorporation by the stakeholders of information
about insolvency cases. Much research has already been developed in
this regard: a summary of the progress made by the research literature







One relevant question, for financial stability purposes, regards the vola-
tility and the shock transmission of financial markets. This is the phe-
nomenon by which a stock market subject to a period of high volatility
can cause the same instability to spread to other markets. On exchange-
traded markets, the volatility of stock prices has been studied through
many channels: none of them is related to the ownership structure of the
firms issuing the shares, namely parent and affiliate firms, or stand-alone
firms. Nonetheless, as stated by Altomonte and Rungi (2013), Multi-
national Enterprises (MNEs) contribute to a large portion of world-wide
added value through the establishment of hierarchies of firms. Therefore,
it is credible that there is a potential for multinationals to act as a channel
for economic shocks, as intented by Desai and Foley (2006). To the best
of our knowledge, what is missing in the literature is a bridge linking
multinational companies and business groups to the share price volatil-
ity, if sucha a bridge does exist. With this study, we aim to fill the gap.
We find that a connection exists, affiliates have a different behaviour on
listed markets compared to their parent, and a business group behavior is
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well defined also on financial markets. We infer that the existence of such
a relationship on financial markets discounts the investors credence that
the business group internal strategy and information are passed quickly
through the property channel, that goes beyond the nationalities of the
companies constituting the business group.
Hierarchies of firms are groups made of a parent and its affiliates,
which have a formally autonomous legal status. Among them, a corpo-
rate control linkage is established for the joint management of productive
activities. Both a parent and some of its affiliates may quote some finan-
cial activities on stock exchanges. We study how such linkages may affect
price volatility across firms that are part of the same hierarchy, possibly
crossing national borders. This is particularly relevant in the case of
multinational enterprises, when one or more affiliates are located in a
country different from the country of the parent company. It is reason-
able to assume that shocks occurring within a hierarchy of firms can be
transmitted:
i. in the same country, across firms, when the group is domestic;
ii. across countries, across firms, when the group is multinational.
We find that corporate control matters. Affiliates reveal less volatility
than their parent companies in weekly prices of financial activities quoted
on the stock exchange. Moreover, after introducing an empirical three-
level model for explaining observed variance, we find that there is less
variance at a group level than across firms and time. That is, price
activities show a narrower range of volatility when a hierarchy of firms
is established. We argue that this is likely due to information on the
common fundamentals that is passed to investors when they consider all
the firms as a unique entity. In this framework, a shock occurring in one
affiliate can pass to its co-affiliates faster, within one country in case of a
domestic group, and across countries, in the case of MNEs.
Our findings are robust to different metrics of volatility and empirical
methodologies. They point to a necessity to include control linkages
when evaluating the prices of financial activities of firms belonging to the
same corporate entity, albeit formally autonomous from a legal point of
view. Take the case of Unilever PLC, located in U.K., with 281 subsidiaries
and six branch locations recorded worldwide. Our dataset catches the
parent company and five of its affiliates, issuing ordinary shares. Parent
shares have GBP currency, while the listed affiliates, located in Ivory
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Coast, Ghana, India, Nigeria, Nepal trade with XOF, GHS, INR, NGN,
NPR currencies respectively. For each of them, as for the rest of firms
of the dataset, we observe the share price of 52 weeks. It must be noted
that those prices vary across both weeks and firms: we choose not to
aggregate in any way the a priori variability stemming from the data, not
to lose their informativeness.
Figure 8: Example: the hierarchical structure of Unilever PLC
The contribution proceeds as follows: in section 2.2 some related
works are introduced. In section 2.3 the data are described. Some de-
scriptive statistics, the construction of the financial covariates and the
observed preliminary evidence are also provided. In section 2.4 the
methodology is explained. In section 2.5 the empirical results can be
found and section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Literature review
Not many papers questions whether corporate control and business
groups matter to financial markets. Restricting the focus on MNEs, one
is Choi and Jiang (2009) relative to the smoothing role of operational
hedging for the exchange risk. The authors find that MNEs, compared
to propensity-score matched non-multinational enterprises, are less ex-
posed to exchange risk and have higher stock returns, thanks to opera-
tional hedging. While this paper focuses on the side of business perfor-
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mance and risk, Aggarwal and Kyaw (2010) assess the positive role of
the firm’s multinationality on its capital structure: they find that multina-
tional companies, compared to domestic companies, have significantly
lower debt ratios, with such debt ratios decreasing with increasing multi-
nationality. Keeping in mind that the static trade-off theory predicts an
optimal capital structure of the firm (the debt/equity ratio that optimizes
its value) the latter finding entails that either all MNEs have a different
debt/equity target from domestic companies, or multinationality becomes
a discriminant towards the preference for a pecking order theory rather
than a static trade-off theory1: this could be indeed the case because of an
asymmetry of information while acquiring external financing, evidenced
by the structure of MNEs, between the inside and the outside group in-
formation available to investors. The question is now if this asymmetric
information evidenced by MNEs does really depend on MNEs multina-
tionality or if it depends just on its business structure. To this purpose,
one could ask whether affiliates’ multinationality facilitates corporate
control: an evidence according to Sturgess (2016), global diversification
premium is positively related to “winner-picking” transfers in internal
capital market. For how it regards internal capital market, MNEs result
to employ internal capital markets opportunistically to overcome imper-
fections in external capital markets according Desai et al. (2004) and Desai
et al. (2005); Foley and Manova (2015) posits that financial frictions and
the use of internal capital markets shape decisions that multinationals
make regarding production locations, integration, and corporate gover-
nance. Desai et al. (2008) provides evidence that multinational affiliates
also access parent equity when local firms are most constrained. This
is the case also for domestic firms: Cai et al. (2016) empirical results on
Chinese firms show that group affiliation decreases cash holdings, allevi-
ating the agency costs due to free-cash-flow problem of undertaking low
profitable investments2. A similar explanation for the use of subsidiaries
and internal capital market is that firms use nonguaranteed subsidiary
debt as a mean to control the wastage of free cash flows in their cash cows
without inducing underinvestment in their growth divisions, according
to Kolasinski (2009). Summing up, this literature seems to originate the
necessity for a corporate control either from agency problems and in-
formational asymmetry, or from financial frictions and imperfections in
1For a review on this topic, see Myers and Majluf (1984), De Haan and Hinloopen (2003),
and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999).
2On agency costs and the free-cash-flow problem, see Jensen and Meckling (1976).
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capital markets. Baker et al. (2003) provides a useful linkage between
stock prices and the firm’s need of external equity: they find that stock
prices have a stronger impact on the investment of firms that need ex-
ternal equity to finance marginal investments. Gul et al. (2010) suggests
that active trading enhances the incorporation of firm-specific informa-
tion into stock prices, and Gârleanu et al. (2015) states that the market is
subject to contagion: an adverse shock to investors in some locations af-
fects prices everywhere, because small changes in market-access costs can
cause a change in the type of equilibrium, leading to discontinuous price
changes. From a macroeconomic perspective, not only there is no strong
evidence that group-level firms are better insured against times of adverse
macroeconomic shocks (see Khanna and Yafeh (2005)), but full integra-
tion of global financial markets may be not very desirable for financial
stability, as risks were spread around the world: even if financial glob-
alization provides a reduction in transaction costs and boosts both trade
and foreign direct investment, the price is in terms of more exposure of
the real economy to financial shocks; international linkages can propagate
economic shocks and rise the default probabilities of firms from different
areas (see Stiglitz (2010), Poelhekke (2016) and Al-Haschimi et al. (2014)
respectively). Increased connectivity among firms plays a role in finan-
cial stability: Desai and Foley (2006) claim is that “multinationals act as
a channel of economic shocks: high correlations of country-wide returns
and investment within multinational firms suggest that shocks that occur
in one part of the world may be transmitted across borders because of a
multinational firm’s world-wide network of subsidiaries”. Eden (2017)
shows that financial integration amplifies shocks in relatively distorted
economies; Cravino and Levchenko (2016) assessed a non-negligible im-
pact of foreign shocks on productivity shocks, transmitted by all foreign
multinationals combined; Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) study the
mechanisms through which output volatility (the volatility of aggregate
output growth) is related to trade openness, with sectors more open to
international trade being more volatile. So, even if business groups have
been studied from both a micro and a macroeconomic perspective, there
are still some open questions such as: do markets and investor recognize
that it exists a group-level financial volatility? Are business groups trying
to minimize their financial volatility using their subsidiaries? Vice versa
are increasing business groups becoming themselves sources of financial
instability, by bringing more connections into the world-wide financial
system?
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2.3 Data construction and preliminary evidence
The dataset can be broadly described as consisting of two main compo-
nents: a static and a time-dependent part. The parent-affiliates dataset
includes all financial information of parent, affiliates and stand-alone
companies; it is relative to the year 2013 and retrieved from Orbis. The 52-
weeks addendum sourced from Bloomberg links the firm’s share prices
to each firm with its kit of corporate information. A parent company is a
firm that owns more than 50% equity of another company, the “affiliate”,
in respect to which it will become the “parent”. An affiliate is thus a firm
having at least (and exactly) one parent company. In our dataset only
listed firms are included: all non-listed affiliates of the parent companies
are excluded from the dataset. The set of all affiliate with their uniquely
defined parent is what we call a business group. A stand-alone firm is
a company with no parent. The world-wide dataset that takes into ac-
count the volatility measure consists of 43′374 firms: 26′644 parent, 2′638
affiliates and 14′092 stand-alone3 firms. The average number of affiliates
per parent is 1.88, with peaks of 64 and 131 affiliates per parent at the
95% and at the 99% frequency percentile respectively. Table 1 shows the
regional distribution of firms into the dataset split by parent, affiliate, and
stand-alone firms. The most populated regions of the final dataset are
the U.S.A., the E.U., and China, followed by Asiatic and Indian regions,
Japan and Canada. The number of affiliates is relevant even though less
than parent companies.
It could be the case of financial volatility being dependent on the firm
structure main indicators rather than the business structure of the group.
We assess the dependence of volatility from several financial variables
of the firms that account for the firm’s structure, productivity, financial
leverage, and credit constraint. We construct four indicators: financial
assets and fixed assets retrieved from the Asset side and equity/debt and
long/short term debt from the Liability side of the balance sheet. Finan-
cial assets approximates the relevance of financial activity vis à vis the
productive activity. This ratio provides a control for financial share price
volatility by revealing the percentage of financial expenditure in financial
investments over the characteristic activity of the firm. The percentage
fixed assets of total assets monitors the investment decisions as a way to
improve productivity. The inverse of the leverage ratio equity/debt is in-
3See data appendix A for details on the data and on the financial variables constructed.
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Table 1: Geographic coverage by type of firm
Region Affiliates Parent Stand-alone Total
Africa 97 431 143 671
Asia - other 418 1’965 2’031 4’414
Canada 191 1’835 1’057 3’083
Central America 76 630 197 903
China 158 3’536 907 4’601
Europe - EU 526 5’260 1’825 7’611
Europe - Non EU 27 348 32 407
India 177 1’024 2’570 3’771
Japan 262 2’654 551 3’467
Korea 86 658 987 1’731
Middle East 232 1’083 917 2’232
Oceania 43 1’338 243 1’624
Russia 69 121 24 214
South America 146 325 139 610
USA 130 5’436 2’469 8’035
Total 2’638 26’644 14’092 43’374
The most populated regions of the final dataset are the U.S.A., the E.U., and China, followed
by Asiatic and Indian regions, Japan and Canada. The number of affiliates is relevant even
though less than parent companies.
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tended to capture a premium of not recurring to external funding and
at the same time it can reveal the health status of the firm, since highly
indebted or less capitalized firms are likely to be less resilient during cri-
sis time. The maturity composition of financial sources reflected by long
term debt over short term debt ratio provides an insight into the financ-
ing choice of the firm: e.g., a high amount of short term debt compared
to long term debt may indicate suffering financing needs. We consider
also the indicators of labour productivity and financial pressure. The latter,
defined similarly to the borrowing ratio of Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999),
is used to assess the premium on borrowing costs and the probability
of credit being rationed. In the post-estimation of section 2.5.3, we use
the Tobin’s q to assess the dependence of the estimated parameter for the
parent on its investment opportunities.
Volatility is defined as the logrange between maximum and minimum
price in a fixed amount of time; for the purposes of this article, that
amount of time corresponds to a week. The measure defines a dispersion
of the price fluctuations around the traded stock price; the exact definition
of volatility is reminded to formula 2.4 of section 2.4.1. Volatility values
are negative and in line with the results of mean estimation of Alizadeh
et al. (2002) that they obtain via Monte Carlo simulation.
Figure 9 plots the volatility values for Unilever PLC and its affiliates
and helps depicting what we are going to assess. In blue, we can dis-
tinguish the behaviour of the parent company over one year. It seems
clearly to represent a trend for its affiliates, even though the latter show
a more widespread volatility. If every parent company with its affiliates
were like this case, the chart would tell the following:
1. the business group listed affiliates show a group behaviour in terms
of volatility, of which the parent seems to dictate the trend;
2. the affiliates behaviour is clearly discernible from the parent one
and adds variability;
3. the group structure does not decompose or disappear through the
weeks, even though some outliers.
The first item postulates the existence of a group-level decision tak-
ing able to influence investors on the stock markets. This is likely due
to information on the common fundamentals that reaches investors con-
sidering the business group as a unique entity. Also, this could reveal
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Figure 9: Volatility of Unilever PLC and its listed affiliates
The behaviour of the parent company (blue) and its affiliates (amber) over one year. The
parent seems to dictate a trend to its affiliates.
unnoticed sources of systemic risk, when the property channel acts as a
chain for the propagation of instability on financial markets. In terms
of methodology and expected results, the observations translate into the
following hypotheses:
1. a multilevel random model is preferable to OLS since there is a
considerable overlap of volatility among a business group;
2. a dummy for affiliate should be significant and with an higher
dispersion compared to the one of the parent company;
3. the snowflake structure depicted by figure 8 is robust across the
weeks, that is the standard deviation coefficients from the multilevel
regression are expected to be significant.
Figure 10 displays mean values and standard deviations by type of
firm4. Listed affiliate firms are slightly less volatile compared to their
4Other descriptive tables can be found in the appendix.
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Figure 10: Volatility (mean and standard deviation) by type of firm
Listed affiliate firms are slightly less volatile compared to their parent.
parent. The expected negative premium to volatility by the dummy affil-
iate is confirmed in table 2, both on the parent and affiliate dataset only
and by regressing on the whole dataset. In absolute terms, the premium
further increases once we standardize the measure of volatility and we
control for cluster on the population of firm identifiers (id). The prelimi-
nary evidence suggests that the parent and affiliates show distinguishable
volatility behaviours, even with the same common trend. This could sig-
nal a strategy of the parent company to build a hierarchy of firms to
stabilize its volatility on financial markets, thanks e.g. to different trade
currencies.
2.4 Methodology
The methodology applied can be easily split into two main modellings:
the mathematical framework for the definition of financial volatility and
the econometric model for the build-up of the results.
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Table 2: Preliminary evidence, excluding and including single firms
Dependent variable:





R squared 0.002 0.002
N 1’281’413 1’841’890
* p< 0.050, ** p< 0.010, *** p< 0.001, standard error in parentheses. Standardized variables,
clustered by firm. The dummy for affiliates is significant and shows a negative premium to
volatility.
2.4.1 The measure of volatility
We use a stochastic model for financial volatility based on stock prices.
Following Alizadeh et al. (2002), we apply a first-order parametrization
to a stochastic volatility model, in which the price S of a security evolves
as a diffusion process5 with both instantaneous drift µ and volatility σ
dependent on a latent diffusion process ν with constant volatility β and
no correlation between the Wiener processes of the price and the latent
variable equation:
dSt = µ(St, νt)dt + σ(St, νt)dWSt
dνt = α(St, νt)dt + β(St, νt)dWνt
(2.1)
5A diffusion process is a Markov process, i.e. a random process whose future proba-
bilities are determined by its most recent values, such that, under several regularity as-




dWSt dWνt = 0
σ(St, νt) = σtSt
σt = exp(νt)
α(St, νt) = α(lnσ − lnσt)
µ(St, νt) = µSt
β(St, νt) = β.
(2.2)
By combining equations 2.1 and 2.2, we have that returns dS/S follow
a geometric Brownian motion:
dSt
St
= µdt + σdWSt
dln σt = α(lnσ − lnσt)dt + βdWνt ,
(2.3)
and therefore, by Itô’s lemma, the log security price process st =
ln St follows a Brownian motion. Alizadeh et al. (2002) prove that the
univariate range, defined as the interval between the maximum and the
minimum log stock price over a period, is an efficient volatility estimator,
nearly log-normal, and robust to market microstructure noise induced
e.g. by the bid-ask bounce. The latter can cause an overestimation of
the measured price volatility that is increased instead by the transactions
bouncing between buy and sell6. Therefore, in case we had chosen the
realized volatility instead of a range-based estimator, the realized volatility
could have accumulated a large bias by summing up upward biased
squared returns, since it is the sum of squared returns over a given
sampling period7. Thanks to the result of Alizadeh et al. (2002) we build
the weekly volatility proxy8 as:
volt = ln(hight − lowt), (2.4)
where hight and lowt represent the observed weekly high and low
6On market microstructure noise, see e.g. Bandi and Russell (2008), Bandi and Russell
(2006).
7For further estimation of stock volatility with range-based estimators, historical evolu-
tion and comparison with other methods, see e.g. Christensen and Podolskij (2007) Jacob
et al. (2008), Martens and Van Dijk (2007), Christensen and Podolskij (2007).
8The equation 2.4 referring to observed prices is also dependent on the index i for each
firm in the population; we omit this subscript for simplicity, minding however the important
dependence.
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prices respectively of the process of log prices st9. Notice that this dis-
persion measure does not depend on the series of opening nor closing
prices, thus it is independent across weeks, since it is function of non-
overlapping increments of a Brownian motion.10
Our methodology will not proceed further by aggregating this mea-
sure across weeks. Although several price-based estimators can serve
well as standard deviation volatility measures (see e.g. Martens and
Van Dijk (2007)), the benefit of our approach consists in a very low ma-
thematical manipulation of the data: since we do not calculate any aggre-
gated measure across the weeks, we are able to translate time variability
genuinely into the model. That reduces some numerical noises, but comes
at a price: the econometric model able to reflect the longitudinal-nested
dataset is one-level more complex than it would be by using an aggregate
measure for volatility across weeks, and it is described below.
2.4.2 The econometric model
Our strategy is to exploit Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) - based
multilevel models, that should be compared to the Ordinary Least Square
(OLS) regression. Multilevel or random-effects models allow for the most
accurate estimation of the regression parameter when there are several
layers inside a variable. Hierarchical, nested or time–dependent dataset
would generally require such an approach to avoid unpleasant fallacies
that lead to estimation biases, such as interpreting associations at the
higher level as pertaining to the lower level. Instead of having to make a
decision regarding the unit of analysis, the use of multi–level modeling
will avoid the fallacies by considering all levels simoultaneously. All the
cases in which we have clusters among the data are better studied through
this kind of methodology: any within–cluster dependence violates the
assumption of ordinary regression models and consequently ordinary
regression produces incorrect standard errors. Furthermore, multi–level
models represent the only way to assess an intra–layer dependence. In
our case the main layers are the population of firms and the parent com-
panies on top of them. We will adopt both the two–level in the case of
9Both the supt=weekjst and the in ft=weekjst are realized into the hight and lowt respectively,
in every closed interval represented by weeks j = 1, 2, ..52.
10E.g., given the series of opening log prices opent, Ht = ln(
hight
opent




ln( hightopent * (
opent
lowt
) = ln(hight − lowt).
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volatility measure aggregated over time and the three–level model when
using our definition of volatility whose value changes over time11.
The intuition that we want to test is whether belonging to the same
business group creates a discrimination at a group level among the popu-
lation of affiliate companies. This group specific bias will be determined
by a group common pattern through, e.g., vertical integration, knowledge
sharing, internal capital markets, group management decisions. We use
a three-level random intercept model instead of a two-level model in
order to keep the time variable for the reasons exposed in the previous
paragraph. The most granular level is given indeed by the time-variable
financial volatility. A middle level is represented by the whole popula-
tion of firms and it is nested into the upper level of parent companies.
Therefore, our model has both a longitudinal design between first two
levels and a cross-sectional or hierarchical design between parent and
affiliates. An example scheme is given in figure 11. It fully reflects the
preliminary snowflake structure evidenced by the example in figure 8.
Figure 11: Nested and longitudinal structure of the three-level model
The three-level model in the base case takes the following form:
11A comprehensive review of multilevel models is provided in Gelman and Hill (2006).
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yti j = β1 + ς
(2)
i j + ς
(3)
j + εti j. (2.5)
The run can estimate the financial volatility yti j among the weeks t =
1, 2, ..52 and the zero means and mutually uncorrelated error components.
In our representation:
∙ the random intercept ς(3)j for parent group j has variance that repre-
sents the between groups portion of variance;
∙ the random intercept ς(2)i j for affiliate i and parent group j has va-
riance that represents the between affiliates and within groups portion
of variance; and
∙ the residual error εti j for week t, affiliate i and parent group j has
variance that represents the between weeks, within affiliates, and within
groups portion of variance.
We will estimate the model (2.5) with several covariates xi j. In the
case we have only the dummy for affiliate xi equal to 1 if the company is
an affiliate company and 0 otherwise the formula is:
yti j = β1 + β2xi j + ς
(2)
i j + ς
(3)
j + εti j. (2.6)
The estimation results by layers will tell if the three-level well captures
the time varying dependency of the volatility against the business group
structure, without soiling the volatility itself with a priori data manipula-
tions imposed by a synthesized mathematical object. The business group
structure itself will be also recognized if we obtain significant standard
deviations at firm and group levels. In this case corporate control will
translate into a well-defined hierarchical object able to play a role for the
price volatility propagation.
2.4.3 The design of the robustness checks
We perform the robustness checks with the most common aggregated
measures for standard deviation of the log prices over the weeks12. The
rationale is that we do not want to choose a specific measure to test
against our model. Since no measure has been classified as the best one
12Specifically, we refer to estimators tested by Martens and Van Dijk (2007).
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by the literature, we make a comparison with many measures to see
whether any of them shows an opposite behaviour or results are in line
among the measure and against ours. If the three-level model depicted
by formula (2.5) served respectively for time, population of firms, and
business groups represented by the parents, once we aggregate over time
we must drop the time in weeks level and use a two-level model below
for the remaining nested part:
yi j = β + ς
(3)
j + εi j. (2.7)
Several volatility measures are estimated at two-level random in-
tercept regressions. Specifically, given the process of log prices st13,
and its observed weekly opening prices opent, closing prices closet, high
prices hight and low prices lowt, and defined the squared return as
r2t = (closet − closet−1)
2, we test the two-level model against:
i. the standard deviation of the “old” variable Volatility;









iv. the Garman-Klass estimator15 =
Σ52t=1
[︁
0.5(hight − lowt)2 − (2ln2 − 1)(closet − closet−1)2
]︁
; (2.10)
v. the Rogers-Satchell estimator16 =
Σ52t=1[(hight − closet)(hight − closet−1) + (lowt − closet)(lowt − closet−1)].
(2.11)
13The same observation of 8 applies here and in all the following formulas.
14The realized range is based on Parkinson (1980) estimator = (hight−lowt)
2
4ln2 .
15For further reference, see Garman and Klass (1980).
16This estimator has the merit of being unbiased whatever the drift µ. For further refe-




Robust OLS regressions without and with financial covariates confirm the
preliminary evidence by showing a negative and significant premium to
volatility from the affiliates in all regressions. Both standard regression
(table 3) and controlling for country and sector (table 6) show no re-
levant impact on volatility except for the percentage fixed assets. The
negative dependence found suggests that firms with a higher percentage
of investments are less volatile on financial markets. When controlling
on the total population of firms, the impact of the financing structure
becomes significant and positively correlated to volatility. This signals
that the financing time-structure of the firm matters when no business
group is identified and firms are standing-alone. No role seem to play
labour productivity and financial pressure. The coefficient of the capital
structure equity/debt becomes slightly significant when controlling for
country and sector fixed effects (see table 6) and positively correlated to
volatility. Firms therefore face some form of credit market imperfections
in violation of Modigliani and Miller (1958), and the ones with higher
equity are less volatile. In the same table 6 the positive coefficient of
long term over short term debt indicates that firms preferring short term
borrowing are likely to have lower stock price volatility, probably because
of a higher default risk or difficulties in getting longer debt financing. No
relevant difference in all regression is found instead when inserting time
fixed effects.
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Table 3: OLS regressions, excluding (P&A) and including single firms (All)
Dependent variable:
Volatility P&A All P&A All P&A All
Affiliate -0.155*** -0.189*** -0.085*** -0.125*** -0.077*** -0.110***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025)
Labour productivity -0.021 -0.026* -0.012 -0.015
(0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011)
Financial pressure 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Financial assets -0.267 -0.310
(0.578) (0.536)
Fixed assets -0.047*** -0.061***
(0.011) (0.009)
Equity / debt -0.005 -0.003
(0.006) (0.006)
Long / short debt 0.084 0.058***
(0.054) (0.009)
Constant -0.023*** 0.011*** -0.088*** -0.047*** -0.119*** -0.080***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011)
R squared 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.005
N 1’281’413 1’841’890 324’367 406’751 258’830 311’014
* p< 0.050, ** p< 0.010, *** p< 0.001, standard error in parentheses. Standardized variables, clustered by firm. A negative and significant premium to
volatility from the affiliates is shown in all regressions. No relevant impact on volatility from the other regressors except for the percentage fixed assets.
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2.5.2 Random-effect regressions
The results of the three-level random intercept regression are shown by
table 4. They confirm the OLS results of coefficients sign and significance
representing a double-check one of the other. The random-intercept mo-
del however is able to show the relative intra-dependence within each
business group that the OLS cannot assess, and the low p-values of the
Wald chi square statistics indicate the goodness of fit of the overall three-
level model. The novel evidence of the existence of a financial manage-
ment of a business group is well-defined according to the significance of
the standard deviation coefficients. The volatility among weeks shows
not surprisingly the highest variability, and the standard deviation be-
tween affiliates is generally higher than between business groups. While
controlling for financial variables, we find that labour productivity be-
comes weakly significant despite the financial volatility. While making
the full regression, financial variables are found to be weakly significant
or not significant except again for fixed assets. The behaviour of Unilever
PLC is representative of the behaviour of all business group in the dataset;
all the hypotheses of section 2.4.2 are verified. The strong significance of
the standard deviation coefficients confirms a solid snowflake hierarchi-
cal structure and provides evidence for a well defined financial group-
level actor in volatility transmission mechanisms of financial markets,
the reason of which we date back to the information on the group-level
fundamentals that is available to investors.
2.5.3 Group level sources of volatility
Financial volatility is possibly driven by hidden aspects of parent firms
affecting the whole business group. Indeed, after the three-level model
we are left with an an unexplained source of variability that already
discounts the control put in the estimate. It is given by the intercept ς(3)j
common to every affiliate belonging to the same parent and it represents
the volatility component that is group-specific. We can assess with a
prediction the group-level random intercept, obtaining a fixed parameter,
slightly negative, for all the affiliates population. We can exploit another
advantage of the random-intercept model given by the possibility of
inspecting a source of variability lying outside of the tested model: the
existence of this source of variability indicates that belonging to a group
or another makes a difference. A representation of the random-intercept
at group level Parent and its prediction is given in figure 12.
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Table 4: Random intercept regressions
Dependent variable:
Volatility
Affiliate -0.087*** -0.035 -0.056*
Labour productivity -0.026** -0.013
Financial pressure 0.002 0.002
Financial assets 0.129
Fixed assets -0.042***
Equity / debt -0.006
Long / short debt 0.050
Constant 0.069*** -0.047*** -0.083***
SD (bw. groups) 0.558*** 0.451*** 0.465***
SD (bw. affiliates) 0.604*** 0.490*** 0.423***
SD (bw. weeks) 0.626*** 0.641*** 0.630***
N parent 26’720 6’760 5’344
N affiliate 29’282 7’236 5’676
N of weeks 52 52 52
N of observations 1’281’413 324’367 258’830
Log likelihood -1279623.4 -329578.7 -258105.1
Wald chi2(2) 24.9 11.3 21.4
Prob>chi2 0.0001 0.0104 0.0033
* p< 0.050, ** p< 0.010, *** p< 0.001. Random–effect model confirms OLS results. Financial
variables are found to be weakly significant or not significant except again for fixed assets.
The strong significance of the standard deviation coefficients confirms a solid hierarchical
structure across time.
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Table 5: Group-level sources of volatility
Dependent variable:
Parent
Size -0.135*** -0.137*** -0.141***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N countries 0.739*** 0.816***
(0.055) (0.055)




Constant 0.041*** 0.713*** 0.783***
(0.001) (0.048) (0.048)
R squared 0.109 0.109 0.115
N 265’928 265’928 254’800
* p< 0.050, ** p< 0.010, *** p< 0.001, standard error in parentheses. Standardized variables,
robust. Size, Tobin’s q and numbers of countries in which the parent has affiliates show
significant coefficients; therefore they are correlated to the group–level volatility.
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Figure 12: Graphical representation of the random-intercept at group level
Then we perform a post-estimation regression by testing, for each
parent or group17, some parent-related measures such as size, number of
countries in which the group has affiliates, number of sector of product
diversification and Tobin’s q. The OLS regression takes as dependent
variable the estimate of the group-level random intercept. Results in
table 5 show that size, Tobin’s q and numbers of countries in which the
parent has affiliates show significant coefficients. While the firm’s size
and marketability impacts seem to lower volatility, the group variability
is increased with dispersion across many countries. Firm size is expected
to be positively correlated with the probability that firms attract external
finance under the pecking order theory18; therefore, it is reasonable that
its share market will be more liquid and therefore the group variability
decreases with size. The market value of the firm over replacement costs
17Parent firms balance sheet are consolidated in most of the cases. However, the confusion
between parent and group has not to be considered by an accounting perspective, that would
be misleading because of lack of harmonized accounting reporting, but rather the group
must be intended as per our modelling definition.
18According to De Haan and Hinloopen (2003).
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has the same effect of the firm’s size of decreasing the negative value of
Parent. The impact of sector diversification is not significant.
2.5.4 The results of the robustness check
The econometric methodology outlined in section 2.4.3 is interesting per
se; for how far the study is conceived, it represents also a robustness
check. We provide the results of estimation through alternative measures
of volatility starting from the closest ones to our volatility measure: the
standard deviation of Volatility and the realized range. Left-hand panel of
table 7 shows the behaviour of the OLS results obtained by collapsing the
volatility measure over the weeks with the standard deviation operator.
We can observe that the magnitude orders between the dummy affiliate
effect over the two datasets without and with single firms is the same as
in the three-level model: the effect is higher on the largest dataset. Vice
versa the effect is higher on the smallest dataset for the realized range
(right-hand panel of table 7) and for the other measures of section 2.4.3
(see the Appendix, table 10). Table 9 shows comparison values for the
regression results on the dataset without single firms. All the results
reveal a coefficient of the dummy affiliate still negative and strongly si-
gnificant. Tables 8 and 11 show the results of the two-level model. We see
that the behaviour of the alternative measures of volatility is completely
in line with the results of section 2.5.2 and the standard deviations are
statistically strongly significant for all the measures.
2.6 Concluding remarks
We ask whether Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) and, more in general,
business conglomerates have an influence on the volatility of financial
markets stock prices. While the answer can be intuitively thought as
positive, it is necessary to assess what does a financial management of a
business group means in case it is well defined. To answer the research
question, we build a world-wide dataset of weekly stock prices of quoted
firms linked by a parent-affiliate relationship. We develop a methodology
to assess whether listed firms show a group behaviour and if there is any
relevant difference between parent and affiliates in terms of volatility,
and whether the supposed group structure does not decompose through
the weeks. If the parent-affiliate relationship has an influence over share
prices volatility it can consequently act as a channel for the propagation of
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financial shocks or imbalances on the financial markets. We find that the
parent-affiliate relationship is significantly correlated to financial markets
volatility and a hierarchical two-layer model exists on top of the retrieved
financial data. The empirical investigation confirms the hypotheses and
does not depend on the empirical model chosen. Even adding corporate
regressors commonly used to investigate firms structure, productivity
and constraints, the business group structure keeps significant over the
weeks. We can conclude that corporate control has an impact on financial
volatility. The findings provide a robust definition of business group
acting on financial markets and open the pave for the investigation of new
dynamics through the undiscovered channel of corporate control. The
methodology built can be easily generalized to vertically multi-layered
hierarchical structures; in particular the same methodology could be used




Additional information on the data
The initial dataset consists of a 154 countries dataset, with a total of 63′737
firms, of which 30′550 parent, 3′664 affiliate, 29′523 single companies. Eu-
rope, Asia, India, Korea and South America are the regions where we find
more stand-alone companies than parent firms; in all the other regions
world-wide, we register more companies with at least one affiliate than
single firms.
The financial variables described in section 2.3 are computed at firm
level as follows.
∙ Size is proxied by the year sales;
∙ Financial assets is the share of financial assets (other fixed assets plus
cash equivalent) over total assets excluding other fixed assets and
cash equivalent;
∙ Fixed assets is the percentage of fixed assets over total assets;
∙ Equity / debt is the ratio between shareholders’ funds and long term
debt;
∙ Long / short debt is the ratio between non-current and current liabil-
ities;
∙ Labour productivity is the value added per employee;
∙ Financial pressure is given by interest payments over the profit before
tax plus depreciation;
∙ Tobin’s q is computed as the firm market valuation over the ac-
countable value of fixed assets; precisely, it is computed as 1 plus
the marginal market value of the firm minus its book value.
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Figure 13: Volatility densities by region
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Table 6: Regression with country-sector control, excluding (P&A) and including single firms (All)
Dependent variable:
Volatility P&A All P&A All P&A All
Affiliate -0.126*** -0.148*** -0.105*** -0.135*** -0.100*** -0.123***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022)
Labour productivity -0.015 -0.019* -0.008 -0.009
(0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007)
Financial pressure -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Financial activity -0.207 -0.393
(0.528) (0.488)
Fixed assets -0.050*** -0.055***
(0.011) (0.010)
Equity / debt -0.009* -0.008*
(0.004) (0.004)
Long / short debt 0.083* 0.051***
(0.040) (0.009)
Constant -0.025*** 0.019*** -0.086*** -0.047*** -0.116*** -0.083***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009)
R squared 0.211 0.230 0.164 0.154 0.163 0.156
N 1’274’315 1’809’773 323’707 405’441 258’425 310’214
* p< 0.050, ** p< 0.010, *** p< 0.001, standard error in parenthesis. Standardized variables, clustered by firm.
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Table 7: Robustness check results, standard deviation of volatility and realized range
Dependent variable: SD(Volatility) Realized range
P&A All P&A All
Affiliate -0.090*** -0.136*** -0.249*** -0.088***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Constant -0.038*** 0.008 0.166*** 0.005
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
R squared 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.001
N 29’696 44’446 34’214 63’737
* p< 0.050, ** p< 0.010, *** p< 0.001, standard error in parentheses.
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Table 8: Two-level robustness check results for standard deviation of volatility and realized range
Dependent variable: SD(Volatility) Realized range
Affiliate -0.009 -0.013 -0.007 -0.250*** -0.116*** -0.081***
Labour productivity -0.176* -0.006 -0.015 -0.004
Financial pressure 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003
Financial assets 0.064 0.013
Fixed assets -0.022* -0.030**
Equity / debt 0.001 0.004
Long / short debt 0.058 0.128*
Constant -0.038*** -0.165*** -0.210*** 0.166*** 0.079*** 0.047**
SD (bw. groups) 0.611*** 0.398*** 0.464*** 0.379*** 0.438*** 0.517***
SD (bw. affiliates) 0.672*** 0.526*** 0.273*** 0.870*** 0.587*** 0.363***
N parent 27’084 6’760 5’340 30’602 7’486 5’857
N affiliate 29’696 7’242 5’672 34’214 8’063 6’237
Log likelihood -38883.2 -7222.5 -4387.9 -46672.2 -8878.8 -5860.5
Wald chi2(2) 0.2 4.6 7.7 186.2 20.9 23.3
Prob>chi2 0.6344 0.2025 0.3595 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002
* p< 0.050, ** p< 0.010, *** p< 0.001.
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Table 9: Robustness check results, other measures of volatility
Dependent variable: Realized variance Garman-Klass Rogers-Satchell
Affiliate -0.226*** -0.238*** -0.193***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
Constant 0.157*** 0.161*** 0.130***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
R squared 0.005 0.006 0.004
N 34’214 33’281 33’858
* p< 0.050, ** p< 0.010, *** p< 0.001, standard error in parentheses.
Table 10: Robustness check results including stand-alone firms, other measures of volatility
Dependent variable: Realized variance Garman-Klass Rogers-Satchell
Affiliate -0.074*** -0.081*** -0.067***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Constant 0.004 0.005 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
R squared 0.001 0.001 0.001
N 63’737 61’704 62’964
* p< 0.050, ** p< 0.010, *** p< 0.001, standard error in parenthesis.
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Table 11: Two-level robustness check results, other measures of volatility
Dependent variable: Realized variance Garman-Klass Rogers-Satchell
Affiliate -0.153*** -0.243*** -0.211***
Constant 0.157*** 0.161*** 0.130***
SD (bw. groups) 0.607*** 0.326*** 0.316***
SD (bw. affiliates) 0.755*** 0.889*** 0.891***
N parent 30’602 29’860 30’320
N affiliate 34’214 33’281 33’858
Log likelihood -47012.2 -43536.5 -46103.1
Wald chi2(2) 70.7 174.7 135.8
Prob>chi2 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001









The 2007–2008 financial crisis was mostly caused by liquidity and credit
(counterparty) risks within the banking system. Although liquidity and
Over-The-Counter (OTC) derivatives were the main causes of distress,
one of the most surprising effects was contagion of other financial players
and other markets and sectors. This fact motivated the introduction of
systemic risk as a new building block in regulatory frameworks, such as the
Basel III (see, e.g., Bank of International Settlement (BIS), 2013);
Financial Stability Board (FSB), 2015). Financial instability and syste-
mic risk assessment are attracting increasing interest among researchers
and regulators, and many different approaches and techniques have been
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proposed.1 For example, recent literature on financial systems2 focuses
on payments system, interbanking deposit markets, and OTC derivatives
markets. However, the latter is one of the most difficult to investigate due
to the complexity of the “underlying” transactions, that is, the deriva-
tives’ payoffs with their highly customized structures, and the scarce
availability of detailed data, especially in the past. Aggregated statistics
on OTC derivatives markets are usually released by international orga-
nizations such as BIS (Bank for International Settlement) and OCC (U.S.
Office of Comptroller of the Currency), or banking associations such as
ISDA (International Securities and Derivatives Association). However,
the collapse of 2007–2008 stressed the need for better data in order to
assess systemic risk and prevent market abuse. Therefore, changes in
regulatory frameworks mandated a more detailed description of deals,
thus revealing a more representative and current picture of derivatives
markets (see, e.g., Duffie et al., 2010; Russo, 2010). In the United States,
prior to the Dodd-Frank Act (U.S. 111th Congress, 2010), financial insti-
tutions had fewer obligations regarding the amount of financial leverage,
counterparty risk exposure, market share, and other data that had to be
reported to any regulatory agency. Now, however, new rules require
information on OTC exposure and assign to specific agencies the role
of collecting and sharing data. Similarly, in Europe the creation of the
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the European
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) was motivated by the need to enforce the
provision of data to improve supervision and restraint of systemic risk
(EC (European Commission) (2013); EC (European Commission) (2013)).
In addition, the European Parliament established the European Market
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) with Regulation No. 648/2012 (EUP
(European Union Parliament) (2012)). Both the EMIR in Europe and the
Dodd-Frank Act in the United States aim to provide a more detailed de-
scription of derivatives markets. Although only authorities are allowed
to exploit the highest level of granularity, market players also can benefit
from this flow of data through trade repository services (TRs), which col-
lect and match data and allow the public access to this information.3 In
1We omit review of this strand of literature, referring the interested reader to Bisias et al.
(2012) and Brunnermeier (2016) and the references therein for a detailed analysis of financial
stability measures and models used for assessing systemic risk.
2For instance, a useful review on the application of network theory tools and method-
ologies can be found in Upper (2011).
3For a detailed description of trade repository activities, see, e.g., DTCC (Depository
Trust & Clearing Corporation) (2013, 2014).
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Europe, this results in an intermediate level where data are aggregated
according to, for example, different asset classes and maturity features,
while in the United States, transaction data are reported almost in real
time and it is only confidential data that are not available.4 Thus there is
an increasing need for transparency. In this regard, for OTC derivatives
and central counterparties, useful analyses can be found in Cecchetti et al.
(2009) and Hull (2014), while for interest rate derivatives markets, some
insights can be found in Avellaneda and Cont (2010) and Fleming et al.
(2012).
In this chapter we describe how segments of the OTC derivatives
market are related to each other. In particular, we focus on reciprocal co-
movements during distressed market conditions using a novel database
on OTC transactions that is based on trade repositories data. To study
how sub-markets are mutually influenced we deal with the following is-
sues. First, we identify a suitable set of OTC sub-markets within the IRS
instruments by aggregating deals according to financial and contractual
terms. Unfortunately, identification of a robust sub–market concept is not
straightforward. Along with several financial drivers that provide sup-
port for clustering the whole market, we face some technical problems,
such as the availability and the quality of a wide set of data for different fi-
nancial instruments. We confine our analysis to the most common type of
IRS contracts, that is, fix-to-floating instruments, considering deals where
the underlying rate is USD-LIBOR-BBA, the contractual start is Spot, and
the currency is the U.S. dollar. This represents the most significant subset
in our dataset (which is supplied by IASON ltd5). The identification of
sub-markets is then driven by the maturity of the contract, the frequencies
of the swap legs and the presence of clearing agreements. Second, we
construct an indicator for assessing the level of distress present in these
sub-markets. This distress indicator combines several dimensions useful
for measuring market conditions, such as proxies for the bid-ask spread
of prices, their volatility, the number of deals, and the average traded
volumes. Basically, although we are aware that market distress might be
related to a wide set interacting factors, we focus on a simple and intuitive
4For a deeper study on the divergences between the European Union and the Unites
States in financial market regulations, see, e.g., Acharya et al. (2010), Lannoo (2013), and
Valiante (2010); a valuable reference for better understanding the key requirements involved
in the aggregation of TRs data is provided by FSB (2014).
5Iason ltd is a consulting firm operating in risk management tools and applications. For
references, see http://www.iasonltd.com/.
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framework that synthesizes the main forces affecting market dynamics.
Therefore, the aim of this indicator is to reflect some of the most evident
and relevant dimensions that influence the ordinary course of business
within OTC sub-markets. Third, we analyse the distress dependence
between pairs of sub-markets by means of the copula theory and we in-
vestigate the joint distribution of the increments of the distress indicator.
Copula functions provide mathematical instruments for modeling multi-
variate stochastic dependence structures that are able to capture various
forms of stochastic dependence, not only linear dependencies. In parti-
cular, we estimate the Kendall’s tau correlation coefficients and the joint
upper-tail probabilities (henceforth, joint probabilities of distress). Our
approach is similar to the one introduced in the IMF Banking Stability
Measure report by Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) to describe the dis-
tress interdependent structure among financial institutions. However,
our context of application is completely different and, therefore, we face
technical issues that are specific to our case study (e.g., we do not have
“default” thresholds and so the methodology used in Segoviano and
Goodhart (2009) is not feasible in our case).
Although our approach exploits standard methods used in risk man-
agement, to the best of our knowledge the present work is one of the first
empirical studies based on micro-founded trade repository data. Related
literature includes, for example, Slive et al. (2012), who analyse central
clearing effects in Credit Default Swap (CDS) markets through the Inter-
continental Exchange (ICE) Trust and Clear Europe data, and Markose
et al. (2012), who investigate the role of systemically important financial
institutions (SIFIs) within the U.S. CDS market using Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation (FDIC) data. A very recent paper that exploits data
from the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) is Gehde-
Trapp et al. (2015); however, it focuses on CDS rather than on IRS. A
comparison between official BIS statistics and detailed trade repositories
data is made in Bonollo et al. (2015), who describe how OTC derivatives
market segmentation can be implemented through the provision of more
granular flows of information related to the new regulatory framework.
The novelties of our analysis are both the originality of the dataset that
we exploit to identify specific sub-markets and the distress indicator that
we introduce. We note that despite the several difficulties to be faced
due to the pioneering nature of our work (e.g., the quality of the TRs
data, sub-market identification, and the new distress indicator defini-
tion), our outcomes are consistent with practical intuition. While using a
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micro-prudential approach to analyse the portfolio and risks of a bank is
a complex, albeit sharply focused, task, inferring from global market data
the risks of a portfolio comprised of the entire financial system is a new
frontier in the research. In the past, lack of detailed data and the lack of
an agreed upon definition of systemic risk (see, e.g., IMF, BIS, FSB (2009);
FSB (Financial Stability Board), 2010; Bonollo et al., 2014b) made very
challenging the measurement of distress signals arising from financial
markets. This work aims to introduce into the debate on systemic risk
assessment and financial stability a way to exploit trade repositories data
so as to detect distress and crisis phenomena.
The chapter is organized as follows: after a detailed description of
the dataset and the procedure employed for sub-markets identification
(section 3.2), we introduce the indicator used to investigate distress de-
pendencies among sub-markets (section 3.3). Then, section 3.4 explains
in detail the methodology that we use to estimate co-dependencies. Fi-
nally, the results of our analysis are illustrated and discussed in section
3.5. Section 3.6 concludes and makes some suggestions for future lines
of research.
3.2 Description of the dataset
International statistics on OTC markets are usually provided by several
organizations, such as BIS and OCC, or by banking associations, such as
ISDA. These statistics are based on some reporting dealers, for example
the biggest (a few dozens) commercial and investment banks, that re-
gularly send some low granular data on their own derivatives deals to
these central organizations, which, in turn, publish the information after
having applied data cleaning procedures to avoid, for example, double
counting issues. Although this flow of data covers a high percentage
of the global OTC markets, the information related to both asset classes
and payoffs is not very detailed and may be not comparable among dif-
ferent data providers. For instance, mark-to-market consensus prices
may differ from pre-trade indicative prices and from the actual trade
prices at which derivatives are exchanged. For these reasons, we rely on
a trade repository dataset retrieved from GTRAnalytics,6 which collects
6This is a software developed by the consulting firm IASON Ltd. For references, see
http://www.financial-machineries.com/gtr-analytics.htm
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trade information from several trade repositories and for many types
of instruments, controlling for obvious inconsistencies and mismatches.
The latter process limits potential biases due to data misreporting and
the fragmentation that may arise from merging datasets from different
sources and across many regulations.
Our study focuses on the interest rates derivatives market, which, at
the end of December 2014, accounted for 80% and 75% of the global OTC
derivatives market in terms of the outstanding notional amount and the
gross market value, respectively. In particular, that the swaps market
was worth $381 trillion compared with $505 trillion of the total outstand-
ing notional amount of the interest rate market7 motivates our choice to
study the swaps segments as a representative case study for the global
OTC derivatives market. In particular, for each deal (identified by an ID)
our database specifies the asset class of the instrument and reports a set
of information about contractual terms, including, for instance, time of
execution, effective date and contractual expiry of the deal, the settlement
and the currencies of both underlying assets, payment frequencies, day
count convention, and the notional and the price. In addition, we also ex-
ploit information on clearing agreements and collateral positions, which
enriches the description of market trends and improves risk assessment.
We refer to prices and volumes of actual traded deals in the market,
which extends the traditional use of offered rates (bid/ask quotes shown
by brokers or data providers) and consensus (quotes/prices submitted by
market contributors) data.
3.2.1 Sub-markets identification
Identifying a robust sub-market concept is not straightforward. Along
with several financial drivers that provide support for clustering the
whole market, we must take into account some technical issues, such
as the availability and the quality of a wide set of data for different fi-
nancial instruments. However, although the methodology we propose
is somewhat heuristic, we believe that at this first stage of the study this
is a reasonable approach to analysing co-movements in OTC sub-markets.
7Data refer to BIS statistics and to single currency contracts only. For further references,
see http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm.
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To ensure comparability, we restrict our analysis to fix-to-floating in-
struments. For the same reason, we consider contracts where the under-
lying rate is USD-LIBOR-BBA, the contractual start is Spot, and currency
is U.S. dollar. This represents the most significant subset in our dataset.
Specifically, the identification of sub-markets is driven by the maturity
of the contract, the frequencies of the swap legs, and the presence of clea-
ring agreements. Data investigation suggests considering fix-to-floating
instruments with leg frequencies equal to (3m vs. 3m) and (6m vs. 3m).
In addition, we aggregate deals according to three main maturities: less
or equal to 2 years (Short), between 2 years and 10 years (Medium), and
greater or equal to 10 years (Long). Finally, we distinguish between con-
tracts for which there are clearing agreements (C) and those for which
uncleared (UC) conditions are present (see table 12).
Table 12: Sub-markets definition
Sub-mkt Fix-to-Floating Maturity Clearing
1 (3m vs 3m) Short C
2 (3m vs 3m) Medium C
3 (3m vs 3m) Long C
4 (6m vs 3m) Short C
5 (6m vs 3m) Medium C
6 (6m vs 3m) Long C
7 (6m vs 3m) Short UC
8 (6m vs 3m) Medium UC
9 (6m vs 3m) Long UC
Fix-to-Floating refers to contracts with swap legs frequencies equal to (3m vs 3m) or (6m
vs 3m). Short, Medium, and Long refer to deals with maturities less than or equal to 2
years (Short), between 2 years and 10 years (Medium), and greater or equal to 10 years
(Long). Finally, data are further partitioned according to the presence (C) or absence (UC)
of clearing agreements.
The frequency of leg payments became a relevant factor after the
financial crisis, when it became clear that the frequency of cash flows
changed both the liquidity (funding) risk and the counterparty risk for
the two involved financial agents. This is known as the multiple curve new
framework.8 In other words, one cannot evaluate financial instruments
8See Pallavicini and Brigo (2013).
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without considering the frequency of cash flows since, ceteris paribus, the
IRS fair values will be slightly different. The netting flag is also a very in-
formative variable. For instance, both the Dodd-Frank Act and the ESMA
regulation require financial institutions to employ netting agreements in
transaction management so as to keep credit exposures as low as possible.
In addition, even enterprises are required to follow this practice for deals
above some relevant threshold (e.g., 3 bn Euro in terms of outstanding
notional for interest rate derivatives in the ESMA regulation). For this
reason, we assume that the Yes/No clearing agreement digit can be used
as a proxy for counterparty class, that is, financial institutions vs. enter-
prises.
Although information on traded deals is available for the first part
of 2013, for the following analysis we consider only data from September
2013 to April 2015 since the number of reported deals at the beginning of
2013 is not satisfactory. This choice ensures a good availability of data
throughout the reference period. Table 13 sets out descriptive statistics
for each sub-market.9
9We further check for double counting in the transactions by controlling for contractual
terms. In particular, we consider as duplicated deals those transactions that are equal in
terms of dissemination ID, contractual expiry, effective date, end date, price, and notional
amount.
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Table 13: Number of deals and volumes for each sub-market
IRS (3m x 3m)
Short Medium Long Total
Cleared Uncleared Cleared Uncleared Cleared Uncleared Cleared Uncleared
Number of deals 1,170 154 9,028 706 9,406 133 19,604 993
Notional amount 175,226 8,359 874,483 34,479 412,779 4,131 1,462,488 46,969
IRS (6m x 3m)
Short Medium Long Total
Cleared Uncleared Cleared Uncleared Cleared Uncleared Cleared Uncleared
Number of deals 14,063 2,128 100,555 9,547 92,008 9,405 206,626 21,080
Notional amount 2,301,060 294,994 9,258,744 745,467 4,134,122 396,999 15,693,926 1,437,460
Descriptive statistics refer to the number of deals and their notional amounts (in millions of U.S. dollars) from September 2013 to April 2015. The upper
part shows data for contracts with swap leg frequencies equal to (3m vs. 3m); the lower part shows deals with swap leg frequencies equal to (6m vs. 3m).
Short, Medium, and Long refer to deals with maturities less than or equal to 2 years (Short), between 2 years and 10 years (Medium), and greater or equal to
10 years (Long). Finally, data are further partitioned according to the presence (C) or absence (UC) of clearing agreements. The totals for each combination
(i.e. the statistics for each sub-market) are shown in bold.
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Results suggest that deals involving fix-to-floating instruments with leg
frequencies equal to (6m vs. 3m) are more frequent than those with leg
frequencies equal to (3m vs. 3m). This is more evident once we consider
deals characterized by clearing agreements. In particular, short maturi-
ties are less diffused, while figures are comparable for the Medium and the
Long sub-sets. To identify sub-markets, these descriptive statistics sug-
gest discarding, due to data limitations, uncleared deals of fix-to-floating
instruments with leg frequencies equal to (3m vs. 3m). Therefore, our
final list of sub-markets is comprised of six sub-sets with leg frequencies
equal to (6m vs. 3m) and three sub-sets with leg frequencies equal to (3m
vs. 3m), the latter characterized by the presence of clearing agreements.
3.2.2 Comparisons with other data sources
Official BIS descriptive statistics provide information for OTC derivatives
by currency. At end-December 2014,10 U.S. dollar interest rate swaps were
124 trillion in terms of outstanding notional amount, while in our dataset
(fix-to-floating 3m3m plus 6m3m) the amount is about 14.6 trillion U.S.
dollars, that is, close to the 12% of the whole USD IRS market. Although
a direct comparison between BIS statistics and our sample would require
a more detailed partition of the deals, not yet available in the BIS stati-
stics, we observe a satisfactory coverage of IRS markets in our dataset.
In figure 15 (top), we compare IRS prices of the short maturity bucket
in the cleared case (sub-market n. 4) from the GTRA database vs. data we
obtain from Bloomberg corresponding to the USD 2Y curve. Time series
trends are very similar during the entire reference period with only few
exceptions, most of which are due to a sharper reported price from our
data provider. Similarly, the comparison between the USD 5Y curve and
the medium maturity bucket (sub-market n. 5) shown in the bottom panel
of figure 15 confirms an overall coherence among both sources. There are
some differences, especially in the first period, although on average both
sources of data paints a similar picture. Those differences might be due to
a grouping effect, since even if the medium bucket is mainly influenced
by the 5Y tenor, the presence of other maturities in the bucket (e.g., 3Y,
4Y, 7Y) may affect the aggregated level.
10For references, see http://www.bis.org/statistics/dt07.pdf.
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Figure 15: Comparison between GTRA and Bloomberg time series
IRS GTRA refers to the aggregated time series for deals belonging to sub-market 4 (top
panel) and sub-market 5 (bottom panel). Bloomberg curves refer to USD 2Y and USD 5Y,
respectively. Prices are in percentage.
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Figure 16 focuses on the time series for the uncleared case with short
maturity (submarket n. 7), and reveals quite erratic dynamics. Recall
that the “uncleared” flag signals that the counterparty is more likely to be
a corporation rather than another financial institution. Therefore, several
different factors could be behind this apparently strange behaviour of the
price series:
∙ an up-front is stated in the deal, that is, one of the counterparties
receives a cash amount immediately. To balance it, the IRS fixed leg
might be shifted to offset the upfront;
∙ the IRS pay-off could be highly customized, hence requiring a dif-
ferent fixed level;
∙ there is less liquidity in the IRS segment for the enterprises and
banks may apply some relevant mark-up to offset the counterparty
risk;
∙ a combination of the above factors.
3.3 Distress Indicator
Given a certain set of sub-markets representative of the global OTC mar-
ket of swap instruments, we propose a way to measure their market con-
ditions and to identify whether pairs of sub-markets are reciprocally co-
dependent. We are particularly interested in sub-markets co–movements
that point to distressed scenarios. To this end, we introduce an indicator
of distress that synthesizes several dimensions of market condition. First,
though, it is worth stressing that we do not rely on traditional concepts
of default since markets cannot go bankrupt in a strict sense, although
the absence of transactions can be interpreted in a similar way.
To assess the level of financial distress within each sub-market, we
propose an indicator of distress that is able to capture several aspects
related to financial stability. We assume that the main forces affecting the
level of distress in a sub-market are represented by (i) the bid-ask spread
of the prices, (ii) the volatility of the prices, (iii) the number of deals,
and (iv) the volumes of notional traded amount. These forces reflect the
perception that a wider bid-ask spread indicates deteriorated liquidity
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Figure 16: GTRA Price Time Series for Sub-Market n. 7
Time series refers to deals belonging to sub-market 7. Daily prices are computed according
to the weighted average of the prices of the contracts, where weights are based on the
notional traded amount of the deals. Prices are in percentage.
conditions and that higher price volatility may suggest the presence of
a distressed scenario. Similarly, a lower number of deals (or modest a-
verage notional traded amounts) may signal slowness in the process of
adjusting prices, which may impact the capacity to close positions. These
forces may interact, of course, but here we take a simple approach and
focus only on the direct contributions of each.
In respect to point (i), since we cannot directly deal with bid-ask quotes
and do not know the parts involved in the transactions, we rely on the
ratio between the maximum and the minimum of daily prices as a proxy
for the bid-ask spread within a certain sub-market. This choice is moti-
vated by the fact that a tight daily deviation between the maximum and
the minimum is likely to imply that traded deals have been priced within
a close interval. Although our choice is only a basic approximation of
the bid-ask spread, work on estimation of the bid-ask spread highlights
high/low prices as a way to measure bid and ask quotes in financial mar-
kets (Corwin and Schultz (2012); Deuskar et al. (2011)). For point (ii)
we compute the dispersion in terms of the standard deviation of daily
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prices, while for points (iii) and (iv) we determine the daily number of
deals (cardinality) and the daily average of the traded notional amounts,
respectively. Finally, in order to get less noisy estimates we aggregate
these measures on a weekly interval.11
To gauge the presence of distressed conditions, we note that even in
the Basel model, although single default probabilities are present, the
use of the 99.9% quantile for the capital charge is not related to a spe-
cific event, since it is merely a regulatory confidence level for estimation
of the global credit portfolio’s losses. Therefore, it seems reasonable to
avoid selecting a given threshold above which we state that a certain sub-
market experiences distress. Indeed, we suggest analysing sub-market
reciprocal behavior in the tail corresponding to detrimental conditions.
Future research may wish to explore setting a threshold level, however,
so to design, for instance, a proper backtesting procedure for the model.
Finally, note that the IRS price level represents an average of the forward
(expected) interest rates over the IRS maturity. Hence, any turmoil in the
IRS price and/or observed volumes could jointly reflect market, counter-
party and liquidity aspects.
Tables 14, 15, 16 and 17 provide summary descriptions of the single
components involved in the definition of the distress indicator. Specifi-
cally, for each sub-market we show the average (quarterly or monthly)
of daily observations for, respectively, the logarithm of the ratio between
the maximum and the minimum, the dispersion, the number of deals,
and the average notional traded amount. These statistics show how
sub-markets have evolved over time, possibly revealing some common
pattern that might have affected the overall behaviour as well as the
presence of specific features that characterize certain sub-markets.
Descriptive statistics provide some insight into sub-market behaviours
during the sample period. Regarding the (ln) max/min deviations, for
some sub-markets (1, 2, 3, 4) the first part of 2014 coincides with low
mean values, whereas in the recent period they reach wider deviations.
Conversely, other sub-markets (5, 6, 8, 9) show flattening or even de-
11If there are missing values due to lack of data, we replace them by the cubic spline
interpolation of the available points. To limit potential biases due to outliers, for each
sub-market we cut off 0.025 of the area in each tail of the reference sample distribution.
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1 0.35 0.14 0.10 0.15 0.37 0.37 0.49 0.37
2 0.29 0.24 0.19 0.58 0.71 0.65 0.54 0.55
3 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.19 0.23 0.23 0.20 0.27
4 0.55 0.42 0.54 0.48 0.75 0.86 0.81 0.64
5 1.06 1.06 1.08 1.00 0.83 0.81 0.70 0.76
6 0.43 0.41 0.33 0.34 0.30 0.31 0.42 0.36
7 0.54 0.51 0.80 0.57 0.72 0.66 0.79 0.30
8 1.10 0.98 1.09 0.99 0.83 0.79 0.68 0.62
9 0.53 0.44 0.39 0.33 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.40
The value in a certain cell stands for the natural logarithm of the ratio between the maximum
and the minimum of deals’ prices for the corresponding sub-market and period. Values
are averaged among daily observations, separately for each sub-market. Column headings
refer to the period (monthly or quarterly) considered in calculating mean values.



















1 0.34 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.12
2 0.29 0.26 0.24 0.30 0.32 0.29 0.21 0.21
3 0.20 0.10 0.09 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.17 0.20
4 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.08
5 0.43 0.40 0.46 0.43 0.36 0.32 0.25 0.24
6 0.33 0.37 0.34 0.32 0.28 0.25 0.19 0.19
7 0.15 0.16 0.20 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.22 0.10
8 0.53 0.49 0.51 0.48 0.41 0.36 0.31 0.28
9 0.44 0.41 0.37 0.34 0.31 0.27 0.24 0.34
The value in a certain cell stands for the standard deviation of the prices for the contracts
belonging to the corresponding sub-market and period. Values are averaged among daily
observations, separately for each sub-market. Column headings refer to the period (monthly
or quarterly) considered in calculating mean values.
clining trends during the reference period. These patterns are generally
confirmed when we consider the estimates for dispersions. In addition, it
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1 2.3 1.7 1.5 4.2 5.7 7.5 5.1 4.4
2 3.1 3.0 2.7 24.2 51.0 46.2 35.9 31.6
3 1.8 1.9 2.6 25.3 46.1 47.2 46.9 37.6
4 24.7 28.6 39.1 33.2 40.8 57.2 50.3 48.4
5 183.2 252.0 292.2 257.2 295.0 332.3 309.8 244.1
6 195.5 241.5 228.1 223.5 272.7 311.1 320.5 251.7
7 6.4 5.3 6.3 5.2 7.2 9.6 8.5 4.5
8 25.4 21.0 25.6 24.4 33.2 40.7 22.5 16.5
9 30.2 25.0 21.6 18.4 35.8 44.1 21.3 13.6
The value in a certain cell stands for the number of deals corresponding to that sub-market
and period. Values are averaged among daily observations, separately for each sub-market.
Column headings refer to the period (monthly or quarterly) considered in calculating mean
values.



















1 20.0 65.1 62.7 129.4 164.2 167.6 175.6 169.8
2 30.4 32.4 43.8 76.0 98.3 102.7 98.7 104.4
3 30.9 31.9 39.4 37.3 41.9 46.8 44.9 40.9
4 153.8 166.5 152.8 157.9 144.8 161.4 186.2 178.8
5 77.2 95.5 94.4 93.2 91.0 93.9 89.7 87.4
6 43.0 49.1 46.1 45.1 43.5 45.4 42.8 42.5
7 84.5 142.7 138.3 148.59 136.4 129.3 154.0 205.7
8 55.9 67.3 83.2 78.6 72.2 81.1 84.0 98.1
9 36.2 40.1 50.2 43.0 38.4 41.1 43.3 47.0
The value in a certain cell stands for the notional traded amount (in millions of U.S. dollars)
corresponding to that sub-market and period. Values are averaged among daily observa-
tions, separately for each sub-market. Column headings refer to the period (monthly or
quarterly) considered in calculating mean values.
may be of interest whether sub-markets with common contractual terms
share similar trends. For instance, the absence of clearing agreements
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(sub-markets 7, 8, 9) does not seem to greatly affect the overall picture,
since pairs of sub-markets (e.g., 5-8 and 6-9) with the same maturity and
the same swap frequency legs but different clearing agreements have
similar estimates. Furthermore, as expected for sub-markets with high
volumes of transactions, those with cleared conditions (from 4 to 6) exhibit
a smaller price dispersion than do the respective uncleared sub-markets
(from 7 to 9). Finally, even for sub-markets with different swap leg fre-
quencies but with the same maturity, the price dispersion is quite similar,
for example, cluster 2 and the parallel cluster 5 in the second part of the
sample period. Moreover, it may be the case that a sub-market has a high
max-min deviation but low dispersion (e.g., sub-market 4). The last two
measures describe an environment characterized by increasing trends in
both the number of deals and the average notional traded amounts, al-
though estimates for the last period seem to indicate a renewed decrease
in transactions. In some cases (e.g., sub-markets 5-6), even though the
average cardinalities are similar, the average notional traded amounts are
quite different. These heterogeneous dynamics suggest considering a set
of measures that will disentangle the overall level of distress for a certain
sub-market. Therefore, the overall picture provided by these estimates
suggests that a reasonable indicator of a sub-market’s condition should
rely on a comprehensive set of measures able to capture several market











where i and t are the indexes for the sub-markets and the weekly
observations, respectively. Max and min denote the maximum and min-





is lower bounded and increases when the deviation be-
tween the max and the min, becomes larger. The symbol σ stands for the
standard deviation of the prices: its impact on the indicator of distress is
positive, as greater volatility might be associated with distressed market
conditions. Conversely, Num (i.e., the number of deals) has a negative
effect since it is assumed that more traded deals implies that it is easier to
find a counterparty, thus limiting liquidity risk. Lastly, the use of mean
volumes (Avgvolume) indicates the average notional traded value of the
deals and is introduced for liquidity purposes. We explicitly consider
each driver (i.e., the deviation max/min, the dispersion, the cardinality,
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and the average traded amount) in the formula for the sake of clarity,
although we are aware that there are some redundant issues related to
the use of Num in the estimates for both dispersion and average volumes.
Although market and liquidity risk drivers play an important role in the
assessment of sub-market conditions, we provide a combined indicator
of distress that aggregates a more comprehensive mix of effects. Relying
on these components reflects the idea that the deviation between the max
and the min is a rough measure of liquidity conditions since it simply
represents a couple of extreme points while ignoring the stream of prices
in the middle. Therefore, we correct this estimate by introducing price
dispersion so as to mimic the effective distribution of the prices. Then, we
further adjust this indicator by adding two other components to take into
account the presence/lack of a sufficient number of deals (and/or average






between cases where the market is characterized by few deals (and/or
with low average notional traded amount) and cases where we observe
more deals and/or higher average notional traded amount.12
We believe that is reasonable to rely on this simple indicator that
captures in a qualitative way (increasing or decreasing indications) the
impacts of the different distress factors, thus allowing us to focus on the
preliminary empirical results. Table 18 shows the average (monthly or
quarterly) of the weekly observations of the indicator of distress as de-
fined above.
Table 18 shows how sub-market distress has evolved over time. These
estimates reflect the joint contributions of the single measures introduced
above. To assess the level of distress within a sub-market, in principle
one should observe the magnitude of this measure, since by construc-
tion higher values correspond to deteriorated market conditions. Table
18 reveals some stylized relevant facts. 13 The distress indicator, by
12In addition, one could argue that Equation (1) can be improved by generalizing it with
some parameters to be calibrated in some optimal way, such as:
Ii,t
(︀















13Estimates for September 2013 might even reflect the backload process of the deals. For
instance, in the European Union, the EMIR regulation was in force February 2014. At that
time also the deals already in existence were uploaded by a massive backload process. Hence
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1 12.21 1.63 0.44 0.24 0.16 0.11 0.17 0.10
2 9.61 1.97 1.88 0.28 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.04
3 0.09 0.32 0.05 0.28 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04
4 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01
5 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
6 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
7 0.29 0.51 0.42 0.22 0.31 0.22 0.30 0.05
8 0.46 0.62 0.32 0.34 0.18 0.13 0.16 0.15
9 0.24 0.23 0.15 0.25 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.28
The value in a certain cell stands for the indicator of distress (values multiplied by 109)
corresponding to that sub-market and period. Values are averaged among weekly obser-
vations, separately for each sub-market. Column headings refer to the period (monthly or
quarterly) considered in calculating mean values.
construction, does not have a practical or physical meaning although it
allows some qualitative insights by looking at the ranking between the
different markets. Hence it is worth noting that sub-markets 4 to 6 (which
involve bank-to-bank most liquid sub-markets) show a very low distress
level. If we analyze the other sub-markets (from 7 to 9), it seems that the
uncleared ones (usually deals between bank-to-enterprise) are riskier. This
is mainly due to the lack of liquidity and/or large min-max range.
In other words, this indicator allows us to capture in a formal and in-
tuitive way the causal forces that could move sub-markets toward a dis-
tressed state. To switch from a useful but still descriptive representation
to an investigation into how sub-markets are reciprocally influenced, we
analyze how pairs of sub-markets are jointly dependent, that is, how sub-
market distress co-moves. Therefore, we study the dependence structure
of the co-movements by computing, for each sub-market, the following
increments of the indicator of distress:
we doubt the quality of the oldest data. In fact, from the effective trade repository feed-
running process, the distress indicators become lower and more stable. Note also that the
VIX popular index, i.e., the volatility index of the S&P index level, did not reach abnormal
levels at the end of 2014. In September 2013, the average level was 14.65%, just 50 bps






for i = 1, ...,S and t = 0, ...,T − 1. Hence, a sub-market that exhibits
positive increments implies that it experiences deteriorated conditions,
which became more serious if these variations become larger. Thus,
our analysis is focused more on the right tail of the distributions of the
increments, which corresponds to distressed market conditions.
3.4 Methodology
“Distress” is an extreme event, which can be viewed as an upper-tail event
related to the process that describes the movement of the sub-market’s
status. We provide, for each pair of sub-markets, a joint probability of dis-
tress,14 that is, the joint probability that both sub-markets simultaneously
exhibit increments of the distress indicator above a certain threshold.
This approach is similar to the one in Segoviano and Goodhart (2009),
where the indicators known as Banking Stability Measures are presented.
Our methodology is similar in that it views market players as a portfolio
of players, and in providing a distress interdependence structure that is
able to capture not only linear correlations but also nonlinear distress
dependencies among the players in the system.
To compute the joint probabilities of distress, we split the analysis
into three parts. First, once sub-markets have been set up, we study the
form of correlation between each pair of sub-markets and how strong
this relationship is. We exploit the family of Archimedean bivariate cop-
ulas (specifically the Clayton, Gumbel, and Frank copulas). The general
theory of copulas15 states that a joint distribution of some random vari-
ables can be decomposed into a function (called copula) that describes
the interdependence structure among the considered variables and their
14The joint distress of pairs of sub-markets, as well as related terminology, are concepts
introduced in this paragraph and in Section 3.3. Hereinafter, any reference to existing
expressions must be considered in the context of our work.
15As a reference to the copula theory, we rely on the well-known results provided in Sklar
(1959), Nelsen (2006), and Trivedi and Zimmer (2007).
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marginal distributions. The reason for choosing copula functions from
among the Archimedean family is that we want the possible dependen-
cies to be comparable. In addition, the Archimedean family provides,
through a unique parameter (i.e., θ), a proxy for the dependence degree
between the two sub-markets. Second, after identifying the dependence
structures for each pair of sub-markets, we produce a ranking based on
the Kendall’s tau correlation coefficients. Finally, we compute joint prob-
abilities of distress at different marginal threshold levels.
We limit ourselves to bivariate copulas to study the dependence
among pairs of sub-markets. This choice is due to the small number
of available sub-markets. Generalization to multidimensional structures
is possible and in the Appendix we briefly discuss the case with a copula
dimension equal to 3.
In the following three subsections, we illustrate the technical details
of the three steps of our study: identification of the copula function for
each possible pair of sub-markets, the global ranking classification (based
on Kendall’s tau) among different pairs of sub-markets, and computation
of the JPoD for pairs of sub-markets. A final ranking classification of the
pairs of sub-markets based on the latter probabilities is also provided.
3.4.1 The preliminary copula-based procedure
Given S sub-markets and, for each sub-market, T time observations of
the random variable of interest X (described above by Equation (3.3)), we


























where xit represents the value of the observation t for the sub-market
i and xi· is the row-vector that contains all the values related to the sub-
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market i.
Our preliminary procedure takes as input this matrix and returns for
each pair of sub-markets the most appropriate Archimedean copula and
the corresponding parameter θ:
1. The procedure first derives the margin for each sub-market i by
finding the empirical cumulative distribution function ̂︀Fi based on
the corresponding T-dimensional row xi·. For each actor i, we are
assuming the values xi1, . . . , xiT as i.i.d. realizations drawn from the
same univariate distribution.
2. For a fixed pair of different sub-markets, say (i, j), for each cop-
ula type (Cl =Clayton, Gu =Gumbel, Fr =Frank), the procedure
computes the maximum value of the copula loglikelihood and the
corresponding estimated value of the dependence parameter. For-
mally, it maximizes the function defined as





(︁̂︀Fi(xit),̂︀F j(x jt);θ)︁ + T∑︁
t=1
(︁
ln fi(xit) + ln f j(x jt)
)︁
,
(note that the second term does not depend on θ, nor on type) where
ctype(u1,u2;θ) denotes the parametric expression of the density for
the chosen copula (type ∈ {Cl,Gu,Fr}), and records the values `*(i, j),type
and θ*(i, j),type such that
`*(i, j),type = `(i, j),type(θ
*
(i, j),type) = maxθ∈Θ
`(i, j),type(θ) .
Note that we are taking the pairs {(xit, x jt) : t = 1, . . . ,T} as T i.i.d.
realizations drawn from the same bidimensional distribution.
3. For each possible pair (i, j) of different sub-markets, the procedure
finds `*(i, j), θ
*
(i, j), and type
*
(i, j) such that
`*(i, j) = maxtype∈{Cl,Gu,Fr}
`*(i, j),type (3.4)
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and θ*(i, j) and type
*
(i, j) are the corresponding estimated parameter
and the corresponding selected copula-type, respectively.
Equation (3.4) selects the copula that provides the best fit according
to both AIC and SIC criteria16. Indeed, we have the best fit at the
lowest value of the quantity
AIC = −2 × (loglikelihood) + 2 × (n. parameters)
= −2 × (loglikelihood) + 2
SIC = −2 × (loglikelihood) + ln(n. observations) × (n. parameters)
= −2 × (loglikelihood) + ln(T),
respectively, and so at the highest value of the log-likelihood.
3.4.2 The correlation ranking
For each possible pair (i, j) of different sub-markets, the first step of the
procedure selects the copula function, i.e., the type of copula (type*(i, j)) and
the respective parameter (θ*(i, j)). The goal of the second step is to produce
a classification of the most dependent pairs of sub-markets. One way
of measuring the strength of the dependence between two sub-markets
relies on their parameter θ*(i, j); indeed, the Archimedean family of copu-
las provides a measure of dependence between (i, j). However, the theta
parameter is related to the functional form of the copula and so values
of the theta parameter for different copula functions are not comparable.
We thus use the value of Kendall’s tau16 for each pair as the criterion for
the ranking. Denoting by τ*(i, j) the value of the Kendall’s tau coefficient as
a function of θ*(i, j), our procedure considers each possible pair of different
sub-markets and splits the final ranking of the pairs of sub-markets into
two groups: the pairs with a positive Kendall’s tau dependence coeffi-
cient (i.e., τ*(i, j) ≥ 0) and the ones with a negative dependence coefficient
(i.e., τ*(i, j) < 0). Finally, the procedure returns a decreasing ranking of the
pairs of sub-markets based on τ*(i, j) for the first group, and, for the second
group, an increasing ranking of the pairs based on the (negative) value
of τ*(i, j). (Note that a negative dependence parameter is possible only for
16For further references, see Mahfoud (2012).
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type ∈ {Cl,Fr}.)
Together with the two classes of rankings (positive and negative), the
procedure returns for each pair (i, j):
∙ type*(i, j) (based on the following code: 1 = Fr, 2 = Gu, 3 = Cl),
∙ the value of the difference diff theta(i, j) = (θ
*
(i, j) − θtype*(i, j),ind) where
θtype*(i, j),ind is the value for the chosen copula type
*
(i, j) corresponding
to the independence case,17
∙ the estimated value for the Kendall’s tau τ*(i, j) as a function of the
theta parameter for the selected copula,
∙ the empirical value e τ*(i, j) of the Kendall’s tau.
3.4.3 Joint Probability of Distress (JPoD)
Once the appropriateness of the selected copula model has been veri-
fied, the analysis continues by computing, for each pair of sub-markets,
the joint probability that both simultaneously exhibit increments of the
distress indicator above some threshold, that is, the joint probability of
distress. We calculate this probability at different marginal threshold
levels. Recall that in the Basel Vasiceck-Gordy model, the choice of a cer-
tain quantile (e.g., 99.9%) for the capital charge is not related to a specific
event of distress, but it is merely a regulatory confidence level for esti-
mation of the global credit portfolio’s losses. Therefore, in our context,
it seems reasonable to avoid selecting a given “distress threshold” and
we thus analyse sub-markets’ joint behaviour in the right tail at different
marginal levels. More precisely, if we denote by Xi and X j the increments
of the distress indicator (defined in Section 3.3) for sub-markets i and j,
respectively, then, for each pair (x, y) of real numbers, we have:
17The parameters that correspond to the independence case are: 0 (asymptotic value) for
the Frank and the Clayton copulas, 1 for the Gumbel copula.
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P(Xi > x,X j > y) = 1 − P(Xi ≤ x or X j ≤ y)
= 1 − Fi(x) − F j(y) + P(Xi ≤ x,X j ≤ y)
= 1 − Fi(x) − F j(y) + F(x, y)
= 1 − Fi(x) − F j(y) + C(Fi(x),F j(y)),
where Fi and F j are the marginal cumulative distribution functions, F
is the joint cumulative distribution function of the pair (i, j), and the last
equality is due the Sklar’s Theorem. Consequently, we define our joint
probability of distress (JPoD) as:
JPoD(i, j) = 1 − ui − u j + Ctype*(i, j) (ui,u j;θ
*
(i, j))
where ui,u j ∈ [0, 1] are the levels for the marginal cumulative distribution
functions Fi,F j, typically chosen to equal 90%, 95%, and 99%.
3.5 Results
In this section, we present the results obtained applying the methodol-
ogy introduced above to our dataset. In the next tables, sub-markets are
defined as previously (see table 12). Copula types are: 1 (Frank), 2 (Gum-
bel), and 3 (Clayton). In addition, “diff theta” refers to the theta parameter
returned once a copula type is chosen minus the value of the theta pa-
rameter for the independence case for this type of copula. The “e” before
the parameter refers to the empirical estimates (when no type of copula
is imposed but estimates are computed on raw data). Our perimeter is
composed by 25 pairs of sub-markets that exhibit positive estimated Ken-
dall’s tau correlations and 11 sub-markets with negative values. For the
sake of clarity, we consider only the first half of the rankings, that is, the
first 10 and 5 pairs for positive and negative Kendall’s tau, respectively,
thus focusing on those pairs of sub-markets with estimates the greatest
distance from those of the independent case.
Positive Kendall’s tau estimates reveal very interesting behavior if we
focus on the pairs of sub-markets in the first positions of the ranking. Let
us rewrite the nine sub-markets by an integer triple M j, j = 1...9 as follows:
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1 5 6 2 0.48 0.32 0.32
2 5 8 3 0.65 0.24 0.24
3 2 3 3 0.48 0.19 0.20
4 4 5 3 0.45 0.18 0.16
5 1 6 3 0.36 0.15 0.14
6 8 9 1 1.09 0.12 0.12
7 2 7 3 0.25 0.11 0.09
8 1 8 2 0.12 0.11 0.11
9 4 8 1 0.99 0.11 0.11
10 1 5 3 0.23 0.10 0.08
Ranking of reciprocal co-movements. Ranking is shown in a descending ordering based on
positive Kendall’s tau. The I Sub-mkt and II Sub-mkt columns show the pair of sub-markets
selected by our procedure. The Copula column lists the chosen copula type. The diff theta
column sets out the theta parameter returned once a copula type is chosen minus the value








∙ f = frequency, 0 = 3m-3m, 1 = 6m-3m
∙ t = tenor range, 0 = short, 1 = medium, 2 = long
∙ c = clearing, 0 = cleared, 1 = un-cleared.
Hence, sub-markets span a very simple discrete space and we can
define between each pair a Manhattan-like distance, such as:
d(Mi,M j) ≡
⃒⃒⃒












This simple framework reveals that the first four pairs (with respect
to the Kendall’s tau metrics) have the minimum distance between their
components, i.e., d(Mi,M j) = 1. This an appealing finding, since despite
several issues related to the difficulty of identifying sub-markets, such as
pioneering work with TRs data and the new distress indicator definition,
these preliminary outcomes are highly intuitive. In addition, as shown
by table 20, even negative estimates can occur. This is the case for pairs
of sub-markets with quite different maturities and clearing conditions.
Hence, sub-markets with different features are more prone to show op-
posite co-movements, while similarities in financial contractual terms are
more likely to determine positive and high co-movements.









1 5 7 1 -2.23 -0.24 -0.23
2 3 8 3 -0.33 -0.20 -0.24
3 1 3 1 -1.52 -0.16 -0.17
4 7 8 3 -0.22 -0.12 -0.06
5 6 7 1 -0.98 -0.11 -0.10
Ranking of reciprocal co-movements. Ranking is shown in an ascending ordering based on
negative Kendall’s tau. The I Sub-mkt and II Sub-mkt columns show the pair of sub-markets
selected by our procedure. The Copula column lists the chosen copula type. The diff theta
column sets out the theta parameter returned once a copula type is chosen minus the value
of the theta parameter for the independence case. The empirical Kendall’s tau is shown in
the last column.
As shown in tables 19 and 20 for both positive and negative Kendall’s
tau rankings, there is a very high correlation among the empirical Ken-
dall’s tau (e τ*(i, j)), which is calculated on the two vectors not processed
through the copula procedure we employ, and the Kendall’s tau (τ*(i, j)),
which we obtain according to the type of copula chosen for the pair of
sub-markets (i, j) and its estimated parameter θ*(i, j). This correlation is
equal to 0.991 for the positive ranking table and to 0.955 for the negative
one, suggesting that the copula selection procedure provides a good fit.
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Table 21: JPoD at different marginal threshold levels
JPoD ranking Tau Ranking I Sub-mkt II Sub-mkt Copula JPoD 90% JPoD 95% JPoD 99%
1 1 5 6 2 4.4963% 2.1259% 0.4059%
2 8 1 8 2 2.2563% 0.9288% 0.1540%
3 2 5 8 3 1.5457% 0.3985% 0.0164%
4 6 8 9 1 1.4875% 0.3901% 0.0163%
5 9 4 8 1 1.4381% 0.3755% 0.0156%
6 3 2 3 3 1.4142% 0.3619% 0.0148%
7 4 4 5 3 1.3843% 0.3537% 0.0144%
8 5 1 6 3 1.3089% 0.3330% 0.0135%
9 7 2 7 3 1.2176% 0.3082% 0.0124%
10 10 1 5 3 1.2032% 0.3043% 0.0123%
Ranking based on JPoD estimates for different levels of thresholds. Ranking is shown in a descending ordering based on JPoDs. The I Sub-mkt and II
Sub-mkt columns show the pairs of sub-markets selected by our procedure. Column Copula stands for the chosen type of copula. The Tau Ranking column
shows the ranking based on the procedure exploited to select the type of copula for each pair of sub-markets. The last three columns set out the JPoD
associated with different levels of the threshold (90%, 95%, and 99%).
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In the last three columns of Table 21 we report the JPoD at marginal
levels for Fi and F j, both equal to 90%, 95%, and 99%, respectively. Since
we are studying the joint probability of distress, we focus on those pairs
of sub-markets that exhibit positive Kendall’s tau values (see table 19).
The selection of these thresholds is intended to provide some insight
into the relationships at the tail of the distribution, which corresponds
to deteriorated market conditions. Preliminary results suggest that for
the first two pairs the JPoD assumes quite relevant values, while for the
other positions estimates are almost comparable. For instance, the first
pair of sub-markets in the ranking position is (i, j) = (5, 6), meaning that
this pair of sub-markets has the most correlated increases in terms of
percentage of the distress indicators (Ii, I j) at the 90%, 95%, and 99%
levels for the marginal cumulative distribution functions. This pair of
sub-markets shares the same swap legs (6m3m), the same cleared condi-
tions (cleared contracts in both sub-markets), but has different maturities
(Medium vs. Long). In addition, they represent the two most active
segments in the IRS market, as reported in table 13. Therefore, it seems
that the two most important sub-markets in terms of number of deals
and traded notional amounts are also highly co-dependent. At a first
glance, we observe slightly different rankings compared to those shown
in table 19. However, JPoD and Kendall’s tau rankings are coherent once
we focus on a certain type of copula, that is, given the same copula, the
ordering for pairs of sub-markets is the same for both rankings. Finally,
we briefly analyse the second position in table 21, that is (1, 8). This
pair of sub-markets has different swap legs (3m3m vs. 6m3m), different
cleared conditions (cleared vs. uncleared), and different maturities (Short
vs. Medium). Still, they share a high probability of joint distress, thus
supporting the need for further investigation into the features that im-
pact reciprocal influence between sub-markets that are apparently very
distant. Hence, similarities between financial and contractual terms seem
to be responsible for stronger co-dependences in many cases, although
the emergence of high values for JPoD in regard to quite different sub-
markets (pair 1,8) suggests the presence of reasons other than contractual
terms. This underlines the need to identify the key players operating in
these OTC IRS markets, since their roles may influence co-movements
between apparently different sub-markets.
82
3.6 Conclusions and future research
The financial crisis of the last decade motivated a growing literature on
how to model and predict financial distress. Some concepts, such as sys-
temic risk, the contagion effect, and cascade defaults have received a great
deal of attention. Nevertheless, a “new normal” for the risk management
field has not yet been established. If we consider the financial system as
a whole, several challenges need to be overcome, such as the huge num-
ber of risk factors and financial products, their dependence structures,
the lack of complete and granular data about the financial system, the
quality of available data, and the measures to be used to capture and
predict market co-movements. To partially address these issues, we ex-
ploite and combine in an innovative way some new ingredients, namely,
the OTC derivatives data provided by trade repositories along with the
JPoD approach recently suggested by the International Monetary Fund.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt that exploits micro-
founded data from trade repositories to study co-dependence between
financial sub-markets. Specifically, we focuse on the interest rate deriva-
tives as a significant fraction of the OTC market and we defined a distress
indicator by combining four different distress drivers: liquidity, average
traded volumes, volatility, and bid-ask proxies. We then use this frame-
work to study the distress dependencies of some OTC sub-markets that we
built based on contractual and financial features. By analysing both the
descriptive results and the joint probabilities of distress, the proposed
technique seems promising for assessing market co-movements from a
financial stability perspective, with intuitive preliminary results. Similar-
ities between financial and contractual terms seem to be responsible for
stronger co-dependences, although high values for JPoD even regarding
quite dissimilar sub-markets suggest the presence of other drivers that
need to be investigated in future research (such as the role of key market
players active across different sub-markets, something not possible to
identify with our dataset). There is also a need for a more finely tuned
distress definition to calibrate a more general distress indicator formula
that can be applied for backtesting procedures, that is, to assess its pre-
diction properties. Furthermore, other asset classes (equity, credit, forex,
etc.) could be exploited to implement a financial “classical” top-down
sub-market segmentation. Finally, more knowledge about the quality of




Copula functions provides a mathematical instrument for the modelling
of the multivariate stochastic dependence structure. In particular, copu-
las take into account various kinds of stochastic dependence structures
among actors, without any assumption on the one-dimensional marginal
distributions. The concept of copula was introduced during the forties
and the fifties with Sklar (1959), but the evidence of a growing inter-
est in this kind of functions in statistics started only in the nineties (see
Hoeffding (1994) and Nelsen (2006)). Copulas are functions that join
or “couple” multivariate distribution functions to their one-dimensional
marginal distributions. The advantage of the copula functions and the
reason why they are used in the dependence modelling is related to the
Sklar’s theorem (see Sklar (1959)). It essentially states that every mul-
tivariate cumulative distribution function can be rewritten in terms of
the margins, i.e. the marginal cumulative distribution functions, and a
copula. More precisely, we have the following definition and results.
Definition 1 A d-dimensional copula C(u) = C(u1, ...,ud) is a function defined
on [0, 1]d with values in [0, 1], which satisfies the following three properties:
1. C(1, ...1,ui, 1, ..., 1) = ui for every i ∈ {1, ..., d} and ui ∈ [0, 1];
2. if ui = 0 for at least one i, then C(u1, . . . ,ud) = 0;






(−1) j1+...+ jd C(u1, j1 , ...,ud, jd ) ≥ 0
where, for each i, ui,1 = ai and ui,2 = bi.
Proposition 1 Let F be a multivariate cumulative distribution function with
margins F1, ...,Fd. Then there exists a copula C : [0, 1]d → [0, 1] such that, for
every x1, ..., xd ∈ R = [−∞,+∞], we have
F(x1, ..., xd) = C(F1(x1), ...,Fd(xd)).
If the margins F1, . . . ,Fd are all continuous, then C is unique; otherwise C is
uniquely determined on F1(R) × · · · × Fd(R).
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Conversely, if C is a copula and F1, . . . ,Fd are cumulative distribution func-
tions, then F defined by (1) is a multivariate cumulative distribution function
with margins F1, . . . ,Fd.
In the case when f and f1, . . . , fd are the marginal probability density
functions associated to F and F1, . . . ,Fd, respectively, the copula density c
satisfies
f (x1, . . . , xd) = c
(︁




There are different families of copula functions that capture different as-
pects of the dependence structure: positive and negative dependence,
symmetry, heaviness of tail dependence and so on. In our work, we limit
ourselves to the principal copula functions of the Archimedean family
(namely, Gumbel, Clayton and Frank copulas), which model, through a
unique parameter θ, situations with different degrees of dependence.
For more details on copula theory, we refer to the various excellent mono-
graphs existing in literature, such as Joe (1997), Nelsen (2006) and Trivedi
and Zimmer (2007).
Archimedean family of copulas
Here we just recall, in the bivariate case, the principal copula functions
belonging to the Archimedean family that we employ in our analysis












The parameter θ ∈ Θ = (−∞,+∞) ∖ {0} tunes the degree of the













The parameter θ ∈ Θ = [1,+∞) tunes the degree of the dependence.
In particular, the value θ = θGu,ind = 1 corresponds to independence









)︁− 1θ , θ ∈ Θ = [−1,+∞) ∖ {0}.
The parameter θ controls the degree of the dependence. The limit-
ing case θ→ θCl,ind = 0 corresponds to independence.
Kendall’s tau
Consider two random variables X, Y with continuous marginals F1, F2 and
joint cumulative distribution function F 18. The Kendall’s tau correlation
coefficient is defined as:
τ(X,Y) = P {(X1 − X2)(Y1 − Y2) > 0} − P {(X1 − X2)(Y1 − Y2) < 0}
where (X1,Y1) and (X2,Y2) are two independent pairs of random vari-







C(u1,u2) dC(u1,u2) − 1.
In particular, for the Archimedean copulas, the Kendall’s tau can be







− 1) dt − 1] Frank
1 − θ−1 Gumbel
θ/(θ + 2) Clayton.




In the chapter we focus on a copula dimension equal to 2. Generalizations
to higher dimensions are feasible, although it is worth remembering that
in our case we are dealing with only nine sub-markets. Below, we briefly
report the trivariate case and present estimates similar to those in Table
19. The algorithm retains the possibility of choosing between three dif-
ferent copulas (Frank, Gumbel, and Clayton). We estimated all possible
triple results, namely, 84 positions (the number of possible combinations
for nine sub-markets), although for the sake of conciseness we report
only the first 10 positions. Both tables show the value of the parameter
estimated by our procedure minus the parameter for the independence
case (diff theta). Table 3.6 is ordered by decreasing maximum likelihood;
Table 3.6 is obtained by ordering the triples by decreasing diff theta.
Terns that appear in the first 10 positions of both tables should be used
in the financial analysis of the sub-markets, since those should represent
the most trustworthy results as they are found in two different ordering
criteria. Triples (4,5,8), (5,6,8), and (1,5,6) appear in both Table 3.6 and
Table 3.6. The first two pairs share similar contractual terms, that is,
they refer to swap frequency legs equal to (6m3m) and present a short
Manhattan–like distance (it is 4 in both cases, computing by summing
distances among each couple in the tern). Conversely, tern (1,5,6) shows
quite different features and presents a higher distance (it is 6). Thus, even
in the trivariate case, dissimilarity among contractual and financial terms
can imply strong co-movement. Below, we analyse the tables in more
detail, providing a comparison with the sub-markets that appeared to be
co-dependent in the bivariate case as shown in Table 19.
The ranking in Table 3.6 is based on diff theta. Estimates are coherent
with those in Table 19: in the first positions we observe combinations
of pairs (5,6), (5,8), (2,3), and (8,9), that is, pairs of sub-markets that are
strongly co-dependent in the bivariate case are more likely to influence
co-movement also in the trivariate case. Hence, relevant relationships
among pairs of sub-markets seem to emerge regardless of the dimension
of the copula. In addition, we also compare these results to those pro-
vided in Table 21, which gives the output of JPoD (not implemented in
the trivariate case): we find again that sub–markets (5,6), (5,8), (2,3), and
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(8,9) hold top positions in the ranking. Finally, in Table 3.6 we show how
sub-markets are ranked based on the maximization of the log-likelihood.
Even in this case (similar to the one discussed in Section 5), results are
coherent among Tables 3.6 and 3.6 once we consider the estimates within
the chosen type of copula. Overall, this is further evidence of the robust-
ness of our procedure; however, increasing the copula dimension too
much may lead to meaningless results when having few sub-markets.
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Table 22: Ranking based on diff theta (Top 10 Positions)
Ranking ML I Sub-mkt II Sub-mkt III Sub-mkt Loglikelihood Copula diff theta
18 2 5 6 3.81 1 1.11
19 3 5 6 3.60 1 1.07
21 2 3 6 3.21 1 1.02
24 4 8 9 2.79 1 0.91
36 1 8 9 1.65 1 0.70
1 4 5 8 10.54 3 0.48
2 5 6 8 9.69 3 0.44
57 3 5 9 0.60 1 0.42
61 2 4 7 0.47 1 0.37
3 1 5 6 7.70 3 0.37
Ranking of co-movements when copula dimension is equal to 3. Ranking is shown in a descending ordering based on positive diff theta. The I Sub-mkt, II
Sub-mkt, and III Sub-mkt columns show the triple of sub–markets selected by our procedure. The Copula column lists the chosen copula type. The diff theta
column shows the theta parameter returned once a copula type is chosen minus the value of the theta parameter for the independence case. Column
Ranking ML refers to the ranking based on maximization of log-likelihood. Finally, we report for each combination the respective max log-likelihood.
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Table 23: Ranking based on max log-likelihood (Top 10 Positions)
Ranking I Sub-mkt II Sub-mkt III Sub-mkt Loglikelihood Copula diff theta
1 4 5 8 10.54 3 0.48
2 5 6 8 9.69 3 0.44
3 1 5 6 7.70 3 0.37
4 1 5 7 7.70 1 0.37
5 4 5 6 7.23 3 0.36
6 4 5 7 7.23 1 0.36
7 5 8 9 7.21 3 0.37
8 6 7 8 7.21 1 0.37
9 6 7 9 7.21 1 0.37
10 1 5 8 6.08 3 0.33
Ranking of co-movements when copula dimension is equal to 3. Ranking is shown in a descending ordering based on the maximized log-likelihood. The
I Sub-mkt, II Sub-mkt, and III Sub-mkt columns show the triple of sub-markets selected by our procedure. The Copula column lists the chosen copula type.





(MDBs): is it needed?
4.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the key findings on the global financial architec-
ture agreed at international level in the aftermath of the financial crisis
of 2008 and on the process which led to a stronger surveillance and col-
laboration at an international scale. In the meantime, a relevant part in
the credit support to the real economy in less-developed countries has
been increasingly provided by the supranational development banks.
We selected a subsample of ten Multilateral Lending Institutions (MLIs)
that together account for almost a trillion US dollars of the worldwide
supranational lending1. Our sample includes: African Development
Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), Central American Bank
for Economic Integration (CABEI), Nordic Investment Bank (NIB) Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and Interna-
tional Finance Corporation (IFC), European Investment Bank (EIB), Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Inter-American
Development Bank (IADB) and Inter-American Investment Corporation
1Data as at end-2015.
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(IIC)2. We analyse their balance sheet to show a growing lending to non-
financial private sector in the meantime when domestic banks of most
advanced economies3, especially in the Euro area, show an opposite be-
haviour. We argue that this difference in providing support to the real
economy is due to different characteristics of MDBs that allow them to
act counter-cyclically in the event of a crisis and to different regulatory
capital requirements the traditional banking sector is subject to. While
regulation has progressively become stricter for commercial banks, MLIs
lack a common supervisory framework being the only respondent to
sovereign mandates and bylaws. The chapter proceeds as follows. After
a broad overview of the main concepts regarding MLIs in section 4.2,
section 4.3 retraces the historical background of the need for a sounder fi-
nancial regulation and some drawbacks of the latter. Section 4.4 assesses
the role of MLIs into the economy. Section 4.5 exposes the lack of a proper
unified regulatory hat for MLIs and section 4.6 concludes with an open
question.
4.2 What are Multilateral Lending Institutions
(MLIs)
Multilateral Lending Institutions (MLIs) or Multilateral Development
Banks (MDBs) are supranational institutions, owned or established by
governments of two or more countries, to pursue specified policy ob-
jectives such as the promotion of social and economic development in
less-developed member countries, help in regional integration and ex-
pansion of cross-border trade. Renewed goals are set up in the Deve-
lopment Committee Discussion Note prepared in April 2015 jointly by
African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, European Investment Bank), Inter-
American Development Bank, International Monetary Fund and World
Bank Group4. They include:
∙ support of international action on global/regional development is-
sues;
2See the Appendix A for a description of MDBs main activities.
3Advanced economies comprise Australia, Canada, Denmark, the Euro area, Japan, New
Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
4The full note is available at the webpage: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
DEVCOMMINT/Documentation/23659446/DC2015-0002(E)FinancingforDevelopment.pdf.
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∙ promotion of local capital markets and access facilitation to local
currency finance;
∙ strengthening of domestic resource mobilization and public expen-
ditures;
∙ improvement of quality and efficiency of their services to increase
the development impact;
∙ engagement and incentive to private finance;
∙ enhancement of the impact of private sector via inclusion and sus-
tainability; and
∙ improvement in coordination and alignment among MDBs.
Historically MDBs worked under the clause of conditionality. Condi-
tionality refers to a commitment of MDBs borrowers to take the necessary
actions regarding policies, provision of technical inputs, implementation,
and safeguard measures to produce the intended development results.
This principle typically applies to the actions that a borrower must take
to obtain the loan so that failure to comply with these conditions may
result in suspension, cancellation, or recall of the loan. However, accor-
ding to Bhargava (2006) recently the attitude of MDBs changed towards
this principle by reducing the average number of conditions per lending
operation while looking for more evidence of borrowers’ commitment to
reforms and are rewarding reforms already undertaken, increasing tran-
sparency and encouraging public debate on the need for reform.
Humphrey and Michaelowa (2013) acknowledge the far-reaching im-
plications of MDBs activities about international development and pro-
vide the determinants of lending from a demand-side perspective. They
confirm a theoretical argument by which a demand for a loan depends,
among other things, on the balancing of the governance structures of the
MDBs between their borrowing and non-borrowing shareholders and on
the implications of this governance structure for loan cost and bureau-
cratic procedures. The supply-side research on MDBs instead typically
assumes that all countries eligible to borrow from an MDB will always
want to do so, the rationale behind being represented by favourable in-
terest rates compared to other ways of financing and the fact that it is
possible to appoint MDBs without tender due to their special legislative
and not-for-profit status. The important question to be asked in this
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case is what factors might lead an MDB to award a loan to a country or
not. If the country is a shareholder, the MDB’s mandate encourages and
impose the MDB to grant financial support to viable projects that will
improve citizens lives. This applies in particular to sensible issues such
as hunger in the world, health, integration, infrastructures, schooling,
clean energy, research and development. A shareholder country engages
with an MDB able to promote the same desirable values and Sustainable
Development Goals (SDG) as it would, in exchange from the MDB’s side
the commitment to achieve its objectives and at the same time not to
make profits or retain returns without a reasonable justification. Projects
in non-shareholder countries can also be promoted in solidarity to help
to eradicate problems at their roots. In this framework, an important
tool is represented by the Mandates. A mandate is defined as a partner-
ship entered by the MDB with third parties to achieve mutual objectives
and which is passed on financial support pledged by a third party. The
partnership takes the form of a legal agreement between the MDB and a
third party (e.g., a supranational body, an institutional donor, etc.) with
the key criteria of pursuing common objectives and accepting the third-
party support or funding in the form of guarantees, blending or direct
investment, and it has the advantage to boost the impact rather than the
volume of lending by supranationals while keeping at the same time the
financial solidity of the MDB.
While deciding for approval or follow-up of the projects MDBs rely
on a broad spectrum of competencies, internal research, and monitor-
ing tools that consider other non-financial factors (e.g., the added value
and the social impact of a project on a community) compared to the
lending approval of commercial banks. MDBs share the know-how of
their staff also by providing advisory and technical assistance. A busi-
ness preference for economically viable projects aims at keeping MDBs
balance sheets financially robust and at the same time avoid pursuing
risk-seeking behaviours. The paid-in capital from sovereigns, the dis-
posable of callable capital in some cases and MDBs business strategy
contribute to its overall good credit rating that is issued by the Rating
Agencies. We reckon the high rating as a general feature of supranational
institutions as shown by figure 17. One reason for that is a beneficial
treatment for MDBs in case of a sovereign borrower’s default called Pre-
ferred Creditor Status (PCS) or Preferred Creditor Treatment (PCT) consisting
in priority over other creditors in debt repayment. It has no legal basis,
rather constituting a market practice attributable to the incentives faced
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by distressed sovereign borrowers. Thanks to this clause MLIs benefit
the first claim over any funds available from the debtor whereby dis-
tressed sovereigns service their obligations to some lenders even while
defaulting on other debts. this leads to an effective increase in seniority
of MDB claims compared to claims that would otherwise have the same
seniority as stated by Perraudin et al. (2016). This paper assessed that,
although there is no legal basis for PCS, it improves the credit quality of
the institutions as perceived by the bond market, since implied spreads
with no allowance for PCS are higher than those observed when PCS is
introduced. Another advantage of PCS is that member states can grant
MLIs loans preferential access to foreign currencies in the event of a coun-
try foreign exchange crisis. This status has two consequences: it increases
the portfolio quality which helps to get cheaper funding on the market
and it ensures that the resources of the supranational institution are safe
in distress time when other creditors face substantial uncertainty about
full repayment. It is needed so to ensure that the institution can act as
a credible lender of last resort, formulate policies necessary for restoring
economic stability and restructure a manageable level of debt. High credit
ratings also have another motivation that is funding. Most MDBs have
as the main source of funding the bonds issuance on international capital
markets. Therefore, it is important for them to keep a high credit profile
so to guarantee the capital inflows and a low cost of funding. There is
a variety of bonds available to investors including medium–term notes,
local currency bonds, benchmark bonds, targeted bonds, green bonds
and commercial papers. Most products are issued in several currencies,
and some are eligible as collateral for the open market operations.
Credit Rating Agencies such as Standard & Poor’s do recognise supra-
national specificities while making their annual assessment, e.g., S&P
Global Ratings (2016). Here S&P describes an ad-hoc methodology to as-
sess the stand-alone credit profile of the supranational based on the busi-
ness profile and financial profile of the institution. After the stand-alone
assessment of the institution S&P adjusts its final rating by estimating the
notches of uplift stemming from the callable capital if any. S&P consi-
ders only the callable capital from shareholder countries rated above the
institution itself because of possible difficulties in cashing capital during
a distress scenario by countries with a lower credit worthiness.
According to Perraudin et al. (2016), the ability of MDBs to realize their
international development objectives is limited in practice by the need
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to maintain access to low–cost financing in international debt markets,
since the scale of their activities and the level of risk that they can assume
are limited by the market’s view of their solvency as reflected in credit
spreads and agency credit ratings. Although these motivations make
MLIs eager to remain well capitalized, they are quite constrained on the
achievement of this goal through an intervention on equity, via a capital
increase, or through the sustainable generation of annual net surplus,
the reasons being difficult negotiations with shareholders and mandate
to keep low returns. Therefore, to achieve high credit status MDBs act
on the credit quality determinant given by the degree to which MDB
portfolios are diversified or concentrated. Like conventional commercial
banks, the level of diversification across geographical regions and sectors
is an significant influence on the main credit quality measures such as the
probability of default. Unlike most commercial banks, some MDBs have,
also, significant single name concentration risk in that they have relatively
high proportionate exposures to particular sovereigns. Consequently,
they pursue business strategies that benefit from the diversification of
main lending operations. A risk management option is represented by an
Exposure Exchange Agreement (EEA) consisting of an innovative solution
to exchange a particular exposure or pool of exposures between MDBs
in order to reduce MDBs concentration risk. As reported by Belhaj et al.
(2017), the first EEA was approved by the African Development Bank
(AFDB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) in November 2015
and the first three MDB EEA transactions were signed between these
institutions on 15th December 2015.
4.3 Financial crisis, banking sector crisis and in-
creased regulation
As assessed by Moshirian (2011) the 2007-2008 global financial crisis has
provided a unique opportunity to go beyond economic data and attempt
to capture cross–border financial data and other information that could
assist international and national institutions to measure and manage fi-
nancial risk more effectively to avoid regulatory arbitrage. Generally, to
policy-makers and academic researchers financial crisis provide a win-
dow of opportunity to reflect upon the role of financial and banking
regulation and on the cooperation between public and private sectors to
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Figure 17: Overall rating distribution of supranationals in 2016
Source: authors elaboration of data from S&P Global Ratings (2016).
Figure 18: Rating distribution of selected MLIs in 2016
Source: authors elaboration of data from S&P Global Ratings (2016).
restore investors’ confidence in the economy5. Brownbridge and Kirk-
patrick (1999) takes the case of the Asian crisis of 19996 to analyse the
5On the latter topic see e.g. Checki and Stern (2000).
6For a review of the Asian crisis, see e.g. Goldstein (1998), Wade (1998) or Corsetti et al.
(1999).
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financial sector regulation as a contributory factor. Financial regulation
becomes particularly relevant for developing economies where financial
infrastructures may boost the development process and facilitate an ef-
ficient use of resources for economic growth. At the same time, a lack
of supervision and regulation of financial markets configures as a contri-
butory factor to financial failures in distress time. Nobel laureate Joseph
Stiglitz as chief economist of the World Bank about the same Asian crisis
wrote7 that “financial and capital market liberalization - done hurriedly,
without first putting into place an effective regulatory framework - was
at the core of the problem”. Goodhart (2008) points out some regula-
tory failures behind the 2008 financial turmoil based on UK experience:
form of deposit insurance, bank solvency regimes, central banks’ money
market operations, commercial bank liquidity risk management, lack of
counter-cyclical instruments, the burden of cross–border defaults. Even
IMF8 identified several areas in which reforms were needed for a safer fi-
nancial architecture, such as surveillance of systematic risk, international
coordination of macro-prudential responses, cross–border arrangements
for financial regulation and funding for liquidity support. In 2009 the Fi-
nancial Stability Forum (FSF) became the Financial Stability Board (FSB)
to collaborate with other international institutions for safeguarding the
global financial stability and in the same years G20 emerged as a major
global forum to deal with major economic and financial decision-making
process9 .
Many of the issues above have been amended by the legislator10, trans-
lating at the same time into a heavier reporting burden for compliance
especially on financial institutions. In the aftermath of the financial crisis
of 2008 blighted market conditions and stricter national and international
regulatory measures reduced international capital flows and banking ac-
tivity. This translated into a challenging fundraising when Basel rules
on capital requirements were becoming more demanding, not only for
commercial banks but also for insurance companies and consumer credit
7In Stiglitz (2000).
8In Blanchard (2009).
9We remind the reader on international cooperation, convergence and harmonization
on regulation to see e.g. the articles Howarth and Quaglia (2016), Helleiner and Pagliari
(2011) and the book Chey (2014).
10Fratzscher et al. (2016) found evidence that higher capital buffers improved aggregate
bank stability after the great financial crisis, especially in countries with relatively poor insti-
tutions, suggesting that bank supervision/regulation and institutions tend to be substitutes
rather than complements.
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companies. Ultimately this caused less credit to the economy, raising
potential long–run consequences in credit supply. Rajan and Ramcharan
(2016) found that financial regulation after the great depression may have
helped to render the effects of the initial collapse persistent. Ferri (2017)
the new Basel rules impacted negatively on cooperative and savings
banks, especially in the Eurozone. Reduced international capital flows
and bank activity were instead as much the result of national and re-
gional regulatory measures as they were a function of market conditions
according to Epstein and Macartney (2016). Stricter capital requirements
stemming from the increased regulation reversed into harsh times for
banks’ lending: where funding was not enough to reach a sufficient cap-
italization, the result was a contraction in banks assets and a decrease of
banks’ lending activities.
We analyse data from BIS total credit statistics to assess the lending
trend from domestic commercial banks. More specifically, data are BIS
long series on total credit, at quarterly frequency, from the Lending sector
Banks, domestic to the Borrowing sector Private non-financial sector. The
data analyzed answer the research question on who is providing support
to the real economy: we decided not to analyze the intra–banks financial
lending, but the credit just to the private sector. Furthermore, we choose
consolidated domestic banking statistics not to bias the geographic cov-
erage comparison. We show two graphs (Figures 19 and 21) regarding
the stocks of the banks’ lending before of seeing in the graphs (Figures 20
and 22) the ratio between total credit and Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
The latter regards the effect of a shrinkage of credit to the real economy
and is an important indicator for detecting the build-up of cumulative
vulnerabilities during credit booms, when the ratio of credit to GDP de-
viates from its trend by a specified amount. Borio and Lowe (2002) refer
to this deviation as the “credit gap”. They define similarly other mea-
sures such as “asset price gap” and “investment gap”, and calculate the
various gaps using only information that would have been available to
the policymakers at the time that he/she was assessing whether or not
a boom existed (ex–ante information). They assess the validity of combi-
nations of indicators over multiple horizons to account for the difficulty
in predicting the timing of a crisis. They find that keeping a cumulative
trace of imbalances has a better predictive power, and among the indi-
cators examined the credit gap results the best correctly predicting the
largest number of crises with the lowest noise to signal ratio.
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Our results show a decreasing trend of total credit from domestic
banks to non-financial private sectors for advanced economies. This
trend is depicted in figure 19 for advanced economies11 and the case
of the Euro area, the USA and the United Kingdom in figure 21. The
evidence is in line with the results of Eber and Minoiu (2016) for the
Euro area. They assess a banks’ reluctance to adjust capital to stricter
supervision, with a reduction in leverage mostly due to the shrinkage of
assets rather than a rise in equity and a decrease in the supply of credit by
fragile banks. The effects on the real economy are represented by the ratio
of previous total lending to GDP. Figures 20 and 22 show the behaviour on
advanced economies compared to total economies and a sample for the
United States, Euro area, and the United Kingdom respectively. Ichiue
and Lambert (2016) results show that regulatory tightening can explain
about half of the decline in the foreign lending-to-GDP ratio between 2007
and 2013. Next paragraph will show that, while commercial banks were
decreasing their support to the real economy, Multilateral Development
Banks were increasing their lending activities.
11Evidence on each country from all advanced economies can be found in the Appendix
B 4.6.
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Figure 19: Total credit from domestic banks to nonfinancial private sectors (market value) for advanced economies
Source: authors elaboration of BIS total credit statistics from banks to private non–financial sector.
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Figure 20: Total credit from domestic banks to nonfinancial private sectors as a percentage of GDP for advanced
economies
Source: authors elaboration of BIS total credit statistics from banks to private non–financial sector.
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Figure 21: Total credit from domestic banks to nonfinancial private sectors (market value) for UK, USA and Euro area
Source: authors elaboration of BIS total credit statistics from banks to private non–financial sector.
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Figure 22: Total credit from domestic banks to nonfinancial private sectors as a percentage of GDP for UK, USA and
Euro area
Source: authors elaboration of BIS total credit statistics from banks to private non–financial sector.
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4.4 The counter-cyclical role of MLIs into the
economy
MLIs as public institutions are reckoned to have both an investments
shaping and catalysing effect. Already back in the 90’s, Bird and Row-
lands (1997) remarked the potential pivotal role of International Financial
Institutions (IFIs) especially for less developed countries and countries in
transition that experienced external financing as an effective constraint on
economic growth and development. For them, capital inflows could be
used to overcome shortages of domestic saving thereby permitting higher
levels of investment, as well as shortages of foreign exchange permitting
larger quantities of imports. In his view, IFIs should configure not only
as a direct source of multi-lateral assistance but also by influencing flows
from other public and private sources.
Public Development Banks may have a positive effect in reducing
the welfare costs of financial markets imperfections according to Eslava
and Freixas (2016). Similarly, Mazzucato and Penna (2016) referring to
State Investment Banks (SIBs) identifies four different roles in the econ-
omy: countercyclical, developmental, venture capitalist and challenge-
led. Its main finding is that, even though historically very often born
after market-failure fixing, their role is market creating and shaping. A
countercyclical role of IFIs into the economy is reckoned by Berensmann
and Wolff (2014) not only by increasing funds for shock financing but also
after a significant reform of their instruments. About a particular MDB,
the EIB, Griffith-Jones and Tyson (2013) address policy lessons for de-
veloping countries as they seek finance for development in anti–cyclical
financing, closing market gaps in long-term, low-cost and stable infras-
tructure lending. Ratha (2001) thesis is that multilateral loans tend to
behave countercyclically concerning private flows to developing coun-
tries in the short term and to complement private flows in the medium
term by signalling - and often fostering - a better investment environ-
ment in the borrowing country. MLIs are at the crossroad between public
development banks and international financial institutions. Most MLIs
increased their lending operations after the 2008 crisis to support invest-
ments in their countries of operation. According to S&P Global Ratings
(2016), since 2008, supranationals outstanding debt has grown by a yearly
average of 5%, to 1.2 trillion at end-2015 from less than 800 billion at end-
2008. The 1.2 trillion represented 6% of global debt securities and close
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to 1.6% of the world’s GDP at end-2015. MLIs countercyclical role can be
recognised by the fact that there were two peaks of rated supranationals’
debt growth when the economy was most demanding: in 2009, suddenly
after the financial crisis of 2007-2008, by 16% and by 24% in 2012, when
Greece was passing its most severe austerity package, the number of
unemployed Europeans reached its highest ever level and the level of
Spanish borrowing reached a record high.
We analyze S&P’s report in order to retrieve a series of total loans in
the balance sheet of MDBs over time. Figure 23 shows the evolution from
years 2008 to 2015 of net loans in the portfolio assets of our sample of
selected MDBs as reported by their balance sheet12. It can be noted an
increasing trend of investments over the recent years.
12For graphical reasons IIC is not reported due to the small amount of its net loans (less
than 1’000 USD bn).
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Figure 23: Net loans (USD billions)
Source: authors elaboration of data from the collection in time of documents like S&P Global Ratings (2016).
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4.5 MLIs regulation
Despite their enormous role in the worldwide economy and financial
markets, MLIs are not regulated by an international regulatory frame-
work, nor supervised. Historically this was not considered necessary for
the founding members. These institutions do not have depositors and, de
facto, MLIs benefit from a special regime compared to the regulation ap-
plicable to commercial banks worldwide reached by the Basel standards.
MLIs have internal auditing processes, and their financial statements are
externally audited. Nevertheless, there is not a common international
framework aimed at assessing the financial strength of these institutions.
MLIs largely finance their lending activities by issuing bonds on the
international capital markets, and they go through the assessment of
their creditworthiness carried out by the Rating Agencies. Rating Agen-
cies have their methodologies which combine quantitative factors and
qualitative drivers that lead to a final rating taken as a reference by MLIs’
bondholders in their investment decisions.
Given the role of the MLIs in the developed and developing economies
and their growing systemic importance, common industry standards on
how to evaluate MLIs financial strengths might be desirable13. In a
“mild ambition” scenario, this could be achieved by the MLIs themselves
beyond the existing efforts (e.g., COMPAS, Common Performance As-
sessment System; this is a consolidated source of data on how MDBs are
contributing to positive development results born in 2006. The Common
Performance Assessment System or COMPAS is a self-reporting exercise
through which MDBs track their capacities to manage for development
results by measuring with key performance indicators MDBs’ capacity to
apply and improve operational processes toward achieving results on the
ground. Data are provided in seven categories: country-level capacity
development, performance-based concessional financing, results-based
country strategies, projects and programs, monitoring and evaluation,
learning and incentives, and interagency harmonization. MDBs hope
that this system will improve accountability14 and GATS, General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services15). In a more ambitious scenario, a newly
created oversight body should be responsible for defining common regu-
13See the interesting legal point of view of Cottier and Krajewski (2010).
14See more in Bhargava (2006) and at the webpage www.mfdr.org/Compas/index.html.
15See more at https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats.pdf.
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latory rules applicable to MLIs given their specificities and be accountable
for the supervision of the MLIs. Currently, there are no evident needs for
such solution (e.g., from MLIs’ bond investors), but in the era of financial
complexity, prevention is better than cure.
4.6 Concluding remarks
We retrieve some publicly available data on Multilateral Development
Banks (MDBs), their ratings, and their lending in latest years. We com-
pare them with the aggregated data from BIS consolidated total credit
statistics from tear 2000 to year 2016. More specifically, data are BIS long
series on total credit, at quarterly frequency, from the Lending sector
Banks, domestic to the Borrowing sector Private non-financial sector. The
data reveal that commercial banks that have shrunk their lending in most
advanced economies in the considered time framework. On the contrary,
Multilateral Lending Institutions are increasingly supplying credit to the
economy. MDBs finance socially desirable projects in their member states
and abroad. The financing methods they apply are becoming more di-
versified (but mainly through bonds) while their funding increases.
Although there is enough control over project financing, both for projects
social goal and their value assessment, there is no unified international
regulation able to provide to MDBs a supervision. We find that this
lack bypasses MLIs increasing systemic importance and interconnection
worldwide. While the traditional banking sector is supervised to ensure
a proper risk evaluation and sound capital and liquidity buffers in case of
financial distress, there is no analogous supervisory control on such huge
banks, that, in most cases, cannot even rely on callable shareholders ca-
pital. We challenge if the annual credit rating assessment of MDBs by the
Credit Rating Agencies is enough to guarantee financial markets stability
or a unified regulatory hat would be desirable. In this case, the main
effort would be to render MDBs and all the other financial institutions
comparable regarding reporting and regulatory methodology. It will be
not an easy task for the legislator, since MDBs have specificities, e.g., in
terms of portfolio concentration.
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Appendix A.
Main description of the MDBs analysed
AfDB (1964) (African Development Bank)
Its main purpose is to promote sustainable economic growth and reduce
poverty in Africa. Historically, the bank has pursued these goals prima-
rily by setting medium- and long-term loans for public-sector projects;
however, its focus on private-sector lending has increased. The bank
also makes equity investments and provides a variety of financial and
technical advisory services. AfDB also provides development finance on
concessional terms to its low-income member countries that are unable
to borrow on the above non–concessional terms. Money for such loans
comes from the 24 nonregional shareholders in the form of grant contri-
butions. At the end of 2015, its net loans amounted to 13’066 USD billions.
ADB (1966) (Asian Development Bank)
It is owned by its 65 members, 47 from the region and 18 from other parts
of the globe. ADB’s mission is to help its developing member countries
reduce poverty and improve their quality of life. Special consideration
is given to smaller and less-developed countries and projects that foster
regional economic growth. It provides loans, technical assistance, gua-
rantees, grants and equity investments that promote the economic and
social advancement of its members and to encourage public and private
sector investment for development purposes. At the end of 2015, its net
loans amounted to 61’941 USD billions.
CABEI (Central American Bank for Economic Integration)
Its main purpose is to promote intraregional cooperation and economic
growth and development among the countries of Central America. Its
focus is on projects, particularly public-sector infrastructure projects.
CABEI’s small equity investments are predominantly in investment funds.
At the end of 2015, its net loans amounted to 5’905 USD billions.
EBRD (1991) (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development)
It is owned by 60 countries and 2 intergovernmental institutions, the Eu-
ropean Union and the European Investment Bank. EBRD’s charter is
unique among MDBs in that it stipulates that EBRD may work only in
countries that are committed to democratic principles. It fosters the tran-
sition to market economies by the Central and Eastern European and CIS
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countries by promoting private and entrepreneurial initiatives. EBRD
pursues these objectives principally by lending (primarily to the private
sector and to public-sector projects supporting the private sector), ma-
king equity investments, and providing guarantees. EBRD’s share capital
is provided by its members. EBRD does not directly use shareholders ca-
pital to finance its loans. Instead, its triple-A creditworthiness rating
enables it to borrow funds in the international capital markets by issu-
ing bonds and other debt instruments at highly favourable market rates.
Although its shareholders are in the public sector, EBRD invests mainly
in private enterprises, usually together with commercial partners. At the
end of 2015, its net loans amounted to 21’073 USD billions.
EIB (1958) (European Investment Bank)
Its shareholders are the 28 EU member states. Its main purpose is to
help finance balanced economic development in EU member states. The
bank provides loans and guarantees to public- and private-sector bor-
rowers for capital investment projects, mainly in industry, energy, and
the environment. It also lends to EU candidate countries to support their
accession processes and to other non-EU countries in accordance with
the EU’s cooperation and development policies. At the end of 2015 its
net loans amounted at 439’865 USD billions.
IADB (1959) (Inter-American Development Bank)
It is the oldest of the regional development banks. It is owned by its
47 member countries, which include 26 Latin American and Caribbean
states, the United States, Canada, 16 European countries, Israel, the Re-
public of Korea, and Japan. Its purpose is to accelerate economic and
social development in Latin American and Caribbean countries, with
an emphasis on poverty reduction and social equity, modernization and
sector reform, economic integration, and the environment. In support
of these objectives, the bank provides long-term financing at favorable
interest rates to governments, other public-sector entities, and a limi-
ted number of private-sector borrowers. It also provides technical and
advisory services to enhance the efficiency and transparency of public
institutions and supports regional initiatives by producing information
and knowledge for policy discussion and funding technical cooperation
to strengthen regional integration. At the end of 2015, its net loans
amounted to 78’301 USD billions.
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IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
World Bank Group) (1945)
IBRD is the largest constituent of the World Bank Group. The World
Bank Group, which is headquartered in Washington, D.C., is made up of
five institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, the International Development Association, the International Fi-
nance Corporation, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, and
the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes. Each
institution plays a different but important role in the group’s corporate
mission of reducing global poverty and improving living standards in the
developing world. Together, they provide low-interest loans, interest-free
credit, and grants to governments and the private sector in developing
countries for investments in education, health, infrastructure, communi-
cations, and many other purposes, as well as services in support of those
investments. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment focuses on middle income countries and creditworthy low income
countries to reduce poverty by promoting sustainable economic deve-
lopment via loans, guarantees, and related assistance for projects and
programs in its developing member countries. It lends only to govern-
ments, financing these loans primarily by selling triple-A-rated bonds in
the world’s financial markets. At the end of 2015, its net loans amounted
to 155’040 USD billions.
IIC (Inter-American Investment Corporation)
Its main purpose is to promote the economic development of its Latin
American and Caribbean member countries by financing small and mid-
size enterprises (SMEs) without government guarantees. This is achieved
by providing loans and guarantees, making equity investments, mobili-
zing funding from other lenders and providing advisory services. At the
end of 2015, its net loans amounted to 925 USD billions.
IFC (International Finance Corporation, World Bank Group)
IFC focuses on financing private sector projects, in which it may take
an equity stake in addition to lending, to support economic growth and
development by providing loans without government guarantees and
making equity investments in private entities. IFC also acts as a catalyst
through its co-financings, syndications, securitizations, underwritings,
and guarantees, and as a technical and financial advisor, including acting
as an asset manager. At the end of 2015, its net loans amounted to 21’336
USD billions.
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NIB (Nordic Investment Bank)
Its main purpose is to promote sustainable economic growth in member
countries via long-term financing for private and public projects. NIB
also finances projects in emerging markets outside member countries
that are of mutual interest to member and borrowing countries. At the
end of 2015, its net loans amounted to 15’627 USD billions.
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Appendix B.
Total credit from domestic banks to nonfinancial private
sectors (market value) for other advanced economies
Source: authors elaboration of BIS total credit statistics from banks to private non–financial sector.
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Sklar, M. (1959). Fonctions de répartition a n dimensions et leurs marges. Université
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